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2005 SMU AIR LAW SYMPOSIUM
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN AVIATION LAW
CHRISTOPHER R. BARTH
I. AIR TRANSPORTATION SAFETY & SYSTEM
STABILIZATION ACT1
T HE AIR TRANSPORTATION Safety and System Stabiliza-
tion Act ("ATSSSA") sets forth two separate grounds upon
which jurisdiction for September 11-related litigation is proper
in the United States District Court for the Southern District for
New York.' Section 408(b) (1) of the ATSSSA creates "a Federal
cause of action for damages arising out of the hijacking and sub-
sequent crashes . . . on September 11, 2001."' Section
408(b) (3) of the ATSSSA confers "original and exclusive juris-
diction" upon the Southern District of New York "over all ac-
tions brought for any claim (including any claim for loss of
property, personal injury or death) resulting from the terrorist-
related aircraft crashes of September 11, 2001."M Courts have
continued to hold that insurance and reinsurance disputes over
September 11-related losses generally do not fall within these
jurisdictional grants. 5
Notably, the Second Circuit has now addressed the issue in
the context of a reinsurance dispute.6 Although acknowledging
that the terrorist attacks of September 11 were alleged to be a
The author wishes to express his gratitude to the following members of the
Lord, Bissell & Brook LLP Aviation Core Group for their assistance in drafting
this paper: Ann C. Taylor, Jill O'Donovan, Nigel J.D. Wright, Peter G. Daniels,
Mona M. Stone and Marnie S. Bozic.
2 See 49 U.S.C. § 40101, as amended by Pub. L. No. 107-71, § 201, 115 Stat. 597,
645 (2000).
3 Air Transportation Safety and Stabilization Act § 49, 29 U.S.C. § 408 (b)(1).
4 Id. § 408 (b)(3).
5 See, e.g., Indian Chef, Inc. v. Fire and Cas. Ins. Co. of Conn., No. CIV.A.02-
3401-DLC, 3401 (DLC), 2004 WrL 420034 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (holding that claims for
business interruption insurance did not fall within ATSSSA jurisdiction).
6 Can. Life Assurance Co. v. Converium Ruckversicherung (Deutschland) AG,
335 F.3d 52, 53 (2d Cir. 2003).
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"but for" cause of the contract dispute, the Second Circuit nev-
ertheless held that this was not enough to assert jurisdiction
under the ATSSSA.7 Noting that the ATSSSA includes an exclu-
sive grant of jurisdiction, the Second Circuit cautioned that al-
lowing such a "but for" approach would produce absurd results -
requiring cases with attenuated, indirect links to 9/11 attacks to
be heard by the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York." Rather, the court suggested that a case
cannot implicate ATSSSA jurisdiction unless a claim or defense
would require a court to resolve an issue of law or fact concern-
ing the terrorist attacks.' In this case, the court reasoned that
even though the insurance losses at issue were caused by the
September 11 terrorist attacks, those events were not relevant to
resolving the dispute between the reinsurers."0 Accordingly, the
Second Circuit held that there could be no jurisdiction under
the ATSSSA. 11
Commenting on an issue raised by other courts, the Second
Circuit also expressed some concern about whether the appar-
ently broad grant of jurisdiction under section 408(b) (3) would
be Constitutional. 12 It determined, however, that this question
could go unanswered in light of its ruling that the claims at issue
did not implicate the ATSSSA jurisdictional grants in the first
instance.1 3
A different factual scenario led to a different result in In re
September 11th Liability Insurance Coverage Cases.4 This case in-
volved third- and fourth-party complaints filed by defendants in
the September l1th liability cases seeking defense and indem-
nity from certain insurers. 5 Although the court explicitly re-
fused to decide whether such claims fell within the exclusive
grant ofjurisdiction under the ATSSSA, it held that supplemen-
tal jurisdiction was proper under 28 U.S.C. § 136 7 (a). 6 Even
so, the court did appear to justify its decision based on the ex-
7 Id. at 59-60.
8 Id. at 59.
9 Id.
10 Id. at 57.
11 Id. at 59.
12 Id.
13 See also World Trade Ctr. Props. L.L.C. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 345 F.3d
154 (2d Cir. 2003) (refusing to address ATSSSA jurisdictional issues, including
constitutionality, in light of decision upholding diversity jurisdiction).
14 333 F. Supp. 2d 111 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
15 Id. at 114-15.
16 Id. at 116.
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clusive grant of jurisdiction under the ATSSSA.17 The court rea-
soned that if it were to decline jurisdiction, the dispute would be
heard by a state court, without power to hear the "whole dis-
pute.""I This, according to the court, would contradict Con-
gress' desire for uniformity and expertise in dealing with
September l1th cases.19
II. DEATH ON THE HIGH SEAS ACT ("DOHSA") 20
The district court in the EgyptAir 990 litigation rendered two
significant decisions in 2004: one regarding DOHSA and the
other on forum non conveniens.2' In a March 9, 2004, ruling,
the court analyzed the amount of non-pecuniary damages recov-
erable under DOHSA.22 Plaintiffs filed suit seeking non-pecuni-
ary damages under DOHSA for the surviving children of two sets
of deceased parents on the ill-fated flight.23 Additionally, the
estates of the surviving parents to one set of decedents sought
recovery under DOHSA for the loss of decedents' "care, comfort
and companionship." 24 The court conducted a bench trial on
the issue.25
After summarizing the factors relevant to its considerations,
including the fact that the surviving children were "extremely
close to their parents," the court turned its attention to reaching
its conclusions of law.26 The court summarized the history of
the recoverability of non-pecuniary damages under DOHSA, in-
cluding the 1996 amendment that opened the door to such
awards. 27
The court then turned its focus to the potential valuation of
plaintiffs' "care, comfort and companionship" claim 8.2  The par-
ties agreed that damages were warranted, but disagreed on the
appropriate amount recoverable.29 Plaintiffs asked that the
17 Id. at 117.
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 46 App. U.S.C. §§ 761-67 (2000).
21 See infra, notes 369-73.
22 In re Air Crash Near Nantucket Island, Mass., 307 F. Supp. 2d 465 (E.D.N.Y.
2004).




27 Id. at 467-68.
28 Id. at 468.
29 Id.
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court award each family $2,500,000 for the death of each parent,
together with prejudgment interest; EgyptAir offered $75,000
for each child per parent.3 ° In reaching a valuation, the court
noted the terms "care, comfort and companionship" are "not
defined in DOHSA and no other court has construed the scope
of these terms."'" However, the court drew an analogy to mari-
time law's definition of "society" which includes "the range of
mutual benefits each family member receives from the other's
continued existence, including love, affection, care, attention,
companionship, comfort and protection.3 12 It observed awards
for loss of society varied widely. However, the court found in-
structive the awards given in Oldham v. Korean Airlines Co. Ltd.,34
and In re Air Crash Near Cerritos, California." Both matters
awarded non-economic damages of between $100,000 and
$200,000 to the adult surviving children of deceased passenger-
parents. 6 Taking into consideration these valuations, and after
applying present value discounts, the court awarded each of the
surviving children between $180,000 and $210,000 per parent. 7
III. DEEP VEIN THROMBOSIS
Deep vein thrombosis ("DVT") is a condition in which a
blood clot forms deep in the vein system of the lower legs with
potentially serious implications if the clot breaks free and travels
to the heart, lungs, brain or other critical organs.3 Also known
as "Economy Class Syndrome," DVT is associated with long peri-
ods of inactivity during air travel. 9 Individuals at higher risk of
developing DVT include: persons over the age of 60; smokers;
the obese; persons who have been recently confined to a bed;
and persons who recently received general anesthesia or es-
trogen therapy.40
30 Id. at 469.
31 Id. at 468.
32 Id.
33 Id. at 470.
34 127 F.3d 43 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
35 982 F.2d 1271 (9th Cir. 1992).
36 Air Crash Near Nantucket Island, 307 F. Supp. 2d at 470.
37 Id.
38 See Economy-Class Syndrome and Deep Vein Thrombosis, American Heart
Association, at http://www.americanheart.org/presenter.jhtml?identifier=





Passengers who have developed DVT after air travel have sued
airlines based on theories of (1) failing to warn of the risks of
DVT and (2) failing to reconfigure seating to decrease the likeli-
hood of developing DVT.4"
A. DVT AND INTERNATIONAL FLIGHT
Cases involving international travel implicate the Warsaw Con-
vention which requires that a passenger prove that (1) while em-
barking, disembarking, or on board; (2) they suffered an
accident; and (3) the accident caused an injury.4 2 The critical
question then becomes whether the development of DVT consti-
tutes an "accident" under the Warsaw Convention.
A recent Supreme Court decision under the Warsaw Conven-
tion, while not involving DVT, is nonetheless instructive. The
Supreme Court case Olympic Airways v. Husain,4 involved the
death of a passenger on board an international flight after suf-
fering an asthma attack allegedly caused by exposure to second-
hand smoke in flight. The wife of the decedent had specifically
requested that the flight attendant move the decedent away
from the smoking section because the decedent suffered from
asthma.44 A flight attendant refused three requests to reseat the
decedent who eventually suffered an asthma attack and died.45
The Supreme Court framed the issue before it as:
[W]hether the "accident" condition precedent to air carrier lia-
bility under the Warsaw Convention is satisfied when the carrier's
unusual and unexpected refusal to assist a passenger is a link in a
chain of causation resulting in a passenger's preexisting medical
condition being aggravated by exposure to a normal condition in
the aircraft cabin.4 6
The court ultimately decided this question in the affirma-
tive.47 The Olympic Airways court began its analysis by reaffirm-
ing the definition of "accident" for purposes of the Warsaw
Convention stated in Air France v. Saks.48 In Saks, the court de-
fined "accident" as an "unexpected or unusual event or happen-
41 Id.
42 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Transportation by Air, art. 17, Oct. 29, 1934, 49 Stat. 3000. T.S. No. 876.
43 Olympic Airways v. Husain, 540 U.S. 644, 646-48 (2004).
44 Id. at 647.
45 Id. at 647-48.
46 Id. at 646.
47 Id.
4I ld. at 646 (citing Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 397 (1985)).
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ing that is external to the passenger," and not "the passenger's
own internal reaction to the usual, normal and expected opera-
tion of the aircraft. 49
The Olympic Airways court noted that neither party disputed
the definition of "accident" as set forth in Saks.50 Rather, the
parties disputed which event should be the focus of the accident
inquiry: the presence of the ambient cigarette smoke-which the
carrier permitted-or the carrier's failure to assist the
decedent.51
The court ultimately found that both were "links in the chain"
of causes that led to the decedent's death.52 The court rejected
the carrier's argument that the only pertinent injury-producing
event was the "normal" presence of ambient cigarette smoke in
the aircraft's cabin during an international flight.53 The court
noted, "[t]here are often multiple interrelated factual events
that combine to cause any given injury. '5 4 The court held that
"any one of these factual events or happenings may be a link in
the chain of causes and-so long as it is unusual or unex-
pected-might constitute an 'accident"' under the Warsaw
Convention.55
Olympic Airways also argued that the flight attendant had
merely failed to act, and that only affirmative acts could consti-
tute an "event" or "happening" sufficient to cause an "accident"
under the Warsaw Convention. 56 The Olympic Airways court re-
jected this argument.57 Significantly, however, the court held
that the relevant "accident" inquiry is not whether there was ac-
tion or inaction, but whether there was "an unexpected or unu-
sual event or happening. ' 58 Specifically, the court found that
the unexpected and unusual rejection of explicit requests for
assistance constituted an "event" or "happening. '59 Thus, al-
though the Olympic Airways court rejected the carrier's position
that inaction could not constitute an "accident," it did not hold
that inaction, without anything more, would constitute an "acci-
49 Id. at 651 (quoting Air France, 470 U.S. at 405-06).
50 Id. at 650.
51 Id.
52 Id. at 653-54.
53 Id. at 652.
54 Id. at 653.
55 Id.
56 Id. at 654.
57 Id.
58 Id. at 654-55.
59 Id. at 655.
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dent."60 Rather, the necessity of an unusual or unexpected
event would seem to require something more than mere inac-
tion, for example, knowledge that action was required or inac-
tion in the face of circumstances that would appear to require
action.6
The court noted that its conclusion was consistent with the
United Kingdom Court of Appeals' decision in Deep Vein Throm-
bosis and Air Travel Group Litigation,6 2 which involved allegations
of a carrier's failure to warn of the risk of deep vein thrombo-
sis:63 The Olympic Airways court noted that the UK court would
have agreed that the death of the Husain plaintiff had resulted
from an "accident."64 In fact, the Olympic Airways court observed
that the UK court had commented on the lower court opinions
in the Olympic Airways case and reasoned that the flight attend-
ant's failure to move the decedent "[could not] properly be con-
sidered as mere inertia, or a non-event" and "formed part of a
more complex incident, whereby [the decedent] was exposed to
smoke in circumstances that can properly be described as unu-
sual and unexpected."" Moreover, the Olympic Airways court re-
marked that the facts of Deep Vein Thrombosis and Air Travel Group
Litigation were substantially distinct from those at issue in
Olympic Airways.6"
In a 2004 Warsaw decision involving DVT, the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals in Blansett v. Continental Airlines, Inc.,67 re-
versed the District Court's decision in favor of the passenger,
and held that the airline's failure to give warnings to passengers
on an international flight about the risk of DVT did not qualify
as an "accident" under the Warsaw Convention.6"
In its decision, the Fifth Circuit commented that the Supreme
Court in Olympic Airways "specifically left open" the question
whether the failure to give warnings in a case in which there was
no specific refusal to lend aid to the passenger would constitute
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 [2004] Q.B. 234; Quantas Ltd. V. Povey, [2003] VSCA 227, 17, 2003 WL
23000692, 17 (Dec. 23, 2003).
63 Olympic Airnvays, 540 U.S. at 655 (2004).
64 Id.
65 Id. (quoting Deep Vein Thrombosis and Air Travel Group Litig., [2004]
QB., at 254, 50).
66 Id.
67 379 F.3d 177 (5th Cir. 2004).
68 Id. at 182.
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an "accident."69 The court then considered whether the failure
to provide warnings alone could constitute an "accident" under
the Warsaw Convention. v°
In reaching its decision, the Fifth Circuit assumed for pur-
poses of the appeal that a failure to warn of DVT was a depar-
ture from an "industry standard of care. '7' The court, however,
specifically found that even a departure from the "industry stan-
dard of care" was not in and of itself an "accident. '7 2 Rather,
the appropriate test was whether there was an "unexpected or
unusual event. ' v3 In this respect, the Fifth Circuit held that
Continental's failuie to warn of DVT was not an "unusual or
unexpected event" and not a qualifying "accident." Specifically,
the Fifth Circuit recognized that:
Though many international carriers in 2001 included DVT warn-
ings, it is undisputed that many did not. Moreover, Continental's
battery of warnings was in accord with the policies of the Federal
Aviation Administration ("FAA"), which prescribes what warn-
ings airlines should issue to passengers. 74
The Fifth Circuit cited as instructive its decision in the non-
Warsaw case of Witty v. Delta Airlines,75 in which it held that the
warnings reasonably required to be made by an airline were
those enumerated by the FAA and no others.76 The Fifth Cir-
cuit concluded that:
It was not an unexpected or unusual decision for Continental
merely to cleave to the exclusive list of warnings required of it by
the agency that has regulatory jurisdiction over its flights.77
Ultimately, the court would not permit a jury to find that Conti-
nental's failure to warn of DVT constituted an "accident" under
article 17.78 "Continental's policy was far from unique in 2001
and was fully in accord with the expectations of the FAA. Its pro-
cedures were neither unexpected nor unusual. 7 9
69 Id. at 180.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 181-82.
72 Id. at 182.
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 366 F.3d 380, 385 (5th Cir. 2004).







In another favorable decision for the airlines, Rodriguez v. An-
selt Australia Ltd.,,8 the Ninth Circuit affirmed summary judg-
ment in favor of the defendant airline and found that the
passenger's DVT was not caused by an accident within the mean-
ing of the Warsaw Convention.8 1 Specifically, the court found
that the passenger had submitted neither evidence that the air-
line failed to comply with neither any industry standard existing
at the time of the incident nor any other evidence establishing
that the airline's conduct rose to the level of an unusual or un-
expected event.8 2 Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit ruled that the
passenger's DVT was not an accident under the Warsaw Conven-
tion and that he had failed to raise a genuine issue of material
fact regarding whether the airline had departed from industry
custom."
B. DVT AND DOMESTIC FLIGHT
As referenced above, in the non-Warsaw context, the Fifth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals also addressed the DVT issue in Witty v.
Delta Airlines. 4 In Witty, the DVT-stricken passenger alleged
both that the airline was negligent in failing to warn passengers
of the risks of DVT and for failing to provide passengers with
adequate legroom. 5 The District Court denied the airline's mo-
tion to dismiss based on federal preemption, and the Fifth Cir-
cuit reversed. 6  Specifically, the Fifth Circuit found that
plaintiffs must base their state claim for failure to warn passen-
gers of air travel risks on a violation of federally mandated warn-
ings. 7 The court determined that federal regulations did not
require warnings to passengers about the risks or prevention of
DVT and, therefore, the airline was not liable for failing to pro-
vide such warnings.88
The court further rejected the passenger's claim that the air-
line should have provided more legroom.8" Specifically, the
court noted that: "Since requiring more legroom would necessa-
80 383 F.2d 914 (9th Cir. 2004).
81 Id.
82 Id. at 919.
83 Id.
84 366 F.3d 380 (5th Cir. 2004).
85 Id. at 382.
86 d. at 386.
87 Id. at 385.
88 Id.
83 Id. at 386.
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rily reduce the number of seats on the aircraft relate to prices
charged by airlines, such a requirement would impose a stan-
dard relating to a price under section 41713(b) (1) and is ac-
cordingly preempted by the [Airline Deregulation Act]."0
C. DVT MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION (MDL)
In June 2004, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation
(the "Panel") ordered 24 DVT cases transferred and centralized
in the United States District Court for the Northern District of
California.9 The Panel ruled that certain actions "rooted in
complex core questions concerning whether various aspects of
airline travel cause, or contribute to, the development of [DVT]
in airline passengers" could be consolidated for the "conve-
nience of the parties and witnesses and [to] promote the just
and efficient conduct of the litigation. '9 2
The transferred cases involve both Warsaw and non-Warsaw
Convention cases.93 The airline defendants moved to dismiss
the non-Warsaw cases because the Airline Deregulation Act, in




A. AiRLINE DEREGULATION ACT OF 1978 ("ADA")
1. State Claims Preempted
a. Sawyer v. Southwest Airlines- Emotional Distress
In Sawyer v. Southwest Airlines,9 5 plaintiffs sued Southwest for
negligent infliction of emotional distress arising from a flight
attendant's recitation of an allegedly racist nursery rhyme over
the aircraft's intercom during the boarding process. 96
The district court entered an order directing the plaintiffs to
show cause why the defendant was not entitled to judgment as a
matter of law, inter alia.97 Southwest maintained that the ADA
90 Id. at 383.
91 In re Deep Vein Thrombosis Litigation, No. 1606, transfer order (J.P.M.L.
Jun. 22, 2004).
92 Id. at 2.
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 No. CIV.A.01-2385-KH-IV, CIV.A.01-2386-KHV 2004 WL 48899 (D. Kan. Jan.
7, 2004).
96 Id. at *1-2.
97 Id. at *1.
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preempted plaintiffs' negligence claims as they relate to board-
ing and seating procedures, which are "services" under the
Act.9" Plaintiffs argued preemption did not apply as the ADA
(1) only preempts state law on frequency and scheduling of
transportation and selection of markets and (2) does not pre-
empt "run-of-the-mill" tort claims.9"
The court rejected plaintiffs' arguments, finding the ADA did
preempt their emotional distress claims."' In reviewing the his-
tory of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 and the ADA, the court
noted that before 1978, states were allowed to regulate interstate
air travel. 1"" However, with the passage of ADA in 1978, Con-
gress clearly manifested its intent to achieve economic deregula-
tion of the airline industry by "promoting 'maximum reliance
on competitive market forces."1 2 The court found the ADA
includes a "preemption provision which provides that a state
'may not enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other provision
having the force and effect of law related to a price, route, or
service of an air carrier.""'03 "The purpose of preemption was to
maintain uniformity and avoid the confusion and burdens that
would result if interstate and international airlines were re-
quired to respond to standards of individual states."'0 4 After an-
alyzing Wolens and Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., °5 the
district court concluded that the plaintiffs' emotional distress
claims were preempted by the ADA as they involved an airline
"service" relating to the boarding process. 1"'
b. Hallam v. Alaska Airlines, Inc.: State Antitrust & Unfair
Trade Practices
The Alaska Supreme Court, in Hallam v. Alaska Airlines,
Inc.,' O7 considered whether the ADA preempted the application
of an Alaska state antitrust and unfair trade practices statute to
an airline's policies, including the classification of tickets as re-
fundable or non-refundable, overbooking of flights, and ticket
9 Id. at *3.
Id.
Id. at *6.
101 Id. at *3.
102 Id. (citing Am. Airlines v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 230 (1995)).
103 Id. (quoting 49 U.S.C. § 41713 (b)(1) (2002)).
104 Id.
105 504 U.S. 375 (1992).
1" Sawyer, 2004 WL 48899, at *6.
107 91 P.3d 279 (Alaska 2004).
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terms relating to timetables, routes, departure/arrival times and
fares."' 8 Pro se plaintiff sued Alaska Air alleging the airline failed
to honor various terms on his plane tickets.'*9 Plaintiff also at-
tempted to present a class action claim for the airline's violation
of Alaska's Unfair Trade Practices Act and state antitrust law."0
After a bench trial, the trial court ruled in the airline's favor on
all counts and plaintiff appealed.111
After considering the plaintiffs state law claims, the Alaska
Supreme Court turned its attention to plaintiffs assertion that
the trial court improperly denied his request to amend the com-
plaint to reinstate his individual claims after it dismissed them
along with the class claims.' 12 The Hallam court upheld this de-
termination, finding the request was properly denied as Section
41713 rendered the request "futile as the claims were clearly
preempted by the federal [ADA]. ' '" l3 The court noted the
ADA's preemption provision is "'broadly preemptive,' reaching
any state laws or enforcement actions 'having a connection with
or reference to airline rates, routes, or services."" 14 In applying
Section 41713, the court found plaintiffs claims plainly related
to Alaska Air's prices, routes and services. 1 5 Consequently, the
ADA preempted plaintiffs antitrust claims. 16
c. Ruta v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.: "Free Booze" or He Said -
She Said
In Ruta v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.,' 1 7 plaintiff sued Delta for the
airline's decision to remove her from her ticketed flight.1 8
Plaintiff sought recovery under theories of (1) breach of con-
tract; (2) wrongful ejectment; (3) negligence; (4) intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress; (5) negligent infliction of
emotional distress; (6) violation of the Americans with Disabili-
ties Act and (7) defamation."l 9 The parties' factual statements
108 Id. at 282-83.
109 Id. at 281.
110 Id.
111 Id.
112 Id. at 287.
113 Id.
114 Id. at 287-88.
115 Id. at 288.
116 Id.
117 322 F. Supp. 2d 391 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
118 Id. at 394.
119 Id.
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as to what transpired differed widely. 2' Delta alleged that dur-
ing the flight delay, passengers and Delta employees observed
the plaintiff yelling and behaving in a disruptive manner.12 1
This behavior included cutting in line in front of passengers
waiting at the boarding gate counter and yelling at a gate agent
with "foul and shocking" language.1 22 In addition, passengers
observed the plaintiff drinking alcoholic beverages in the air-
port before boarding the plane, and after boarding the plane
she yelled, "free booze!' '1 23 Delta employees said that the plain-
tiff smelled of alcohol. 1 4 A gate agent also alleged and other
passengers confirmed that the plaintiff kicked the agent's leg as
he walked down the aisle, "lifting his skin" and "leaving a red
mark."125The lead flight attendant told the captain of the plain-
tiffs behavior. 26 The captain decided to remove the plaintiff
from the flight and requested the presence of airport security to
help remove the plaintiff from the flight. 127
In contrast, the plaintiff explained that she lost complete
hearing in her right ear in 1975, at the age of fifteen. 128 After
her ear injury, she underwent surgery in which the surgeon took
half of a live nerve in her tongue to graft into a severed nerve in
her face. 129 As a result, her tongue was partially paralyzed, and
she now speaks with a slur and at a louder volume than most
people.13 ' The plaintiff also explained that she took daily doses
of blood pressure, anti-depressant, and pain killer medica-
tions.13" ' The plaintiff said that she generally does not drink al-
cohol. 132 She argued that on the day of the flight, Delta
employees made an announcement that she could not hear due
to her hearing loss.' 33 She waited in line to speak with a gate
agent to ask about the announcement.' 4 The plaintiff claimed
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the hell do you think you are?"1 5 Both the plaintiffs husband
and another passenger observed this exchange.'36 Another gate
agent gave the plaintiff and her family meal vouchers. 137 While
her family purchased food at the airport bar, the plaintiff re-
mained at the gate.1 38 One of the plaintiff's family members
drank a Bloody Mary at the airport bar before returning to the
gate with a soda for the plaintiff.3 9 The plaintiff claimed that
she did not consume any alcoholic beverages that day, nor did
she have any other contact with the gate agent before boarding
the plane and taking her seat. 4 °
While boarding the plane, the plaintiff gave her boarding pass
to female gate agent and said, "Thank you, at least, someone is
acting professionally.' ' 4' In addition, when the plaintiff
boarded the plane, she heard another passenger say, "for all of
those hours we were delayed we should have free drinks."142
The plaintiff laughingly and "unwittingly" loudly replied, "Yes,
we should.'1 43 At this point, the gate agent told her she was in-
toxicated and that she had to leave the plane.'4 4 Although the
plaintiff stumbled before the gate agent reached her row, a pas-
senger said that she did not kick the gate agent. 45 Further-
more, the incident report did not show that the gate agent
consulted with the captain.'46 The plaintiff left the plane when
she was told she would be arrested if she did not do so.' 47 She
also requested a breathalyzer test, which Delta refused to
administer. 148
Delta filed a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b) (6) or, in the
alternative, for summary judgment under Rule 56.149 Delta's
motion contended that all of plaintiffs claims were preempted
by Section 41713 of the ADA or Section 44902(b) of the Federal
135 Id.
136 Id.












149 Id. at 394.
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Aviation Act.'5 1' The district court analyzed each section's po-
tential preemptive effect vis-a-vis plaintiffs various claims. 15' As
an initial note, the court observed, "[ain airline's discretion to
reject a passenger must be accepted if exercised in good faith
and for a rational reason." 152 The court examined the captain
in command's decision to remove plaintiff from the flight and
determined it was not arbitrary and capricious as the captain was
based his decision on the reports he received from the cabin
crew and gate agent. 151
Next, the court considered each of plaintiffs theories of re-
covery. 154 In regard to the tort claims, the court applied the
three-part preemption test outlined in Rombom v. United Airlines,
Inc.,155 to find all of plaintiffs state tort claims, except her defa-
mation claim, are preempted.15 6 "First, the Captain's decision to
refuse to transport Plaintiff constitutes a 'service' under the
1978 Act. Second, the alleged emotional and physical harm suf-
fered by Plaintiff was a direct result of the Captain's decision to
have Plaintiff removed from the plane. Finally, there was noth-
ing unreasonable about the method by which the Captain ef-
fected Plaintiff's removal from the airplane. She was not
arrested, unlike the plaintiff in Rombom."1 57
However, the court refused to find the defamation claim, that
Delta's employees slandered plaintiff by saying she was drunk in
front of the other passengers, was preempted as that claim did
not involve a "service" as contemplated by Section 41713.58
2. No Preemption
a. Schumacher v. Amalgamated Leasing, Inc.: State
Whistleblower Act
In Schumacher v. Amalgamated Leasing, Inc., 151 the plaintiff sued
his former employer for violation of the Ohio Whistleblower
1511 Id. at 397. This section provides in relevant part that "an air carrier ... [is
permitted] to refuse to transport a person or property the carrier decides is, or
might be, inimical to safety." Id. (quoting 49 U.S.C. § 44902(b)).
151 See generally id.
152 Id. at 397.
153 Id. at 398.
154 Id.
155 867 F. Supp. 214 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
156 Ruta, 322 F. Sipp. 2d at 400.
157 Id. at 400-01 (internal citation omitted).
158 Id. at 403. Also, noted the discussion on the Witty case involving federal
preemption of DVT claims.
15. 806 N.E.2d 189 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004).
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Act. Plaintiff alleged that defendant terminated him after he
reported to the FAA that the defendant's Director of Operations
"had consumed alcohol and piloted chartered airplanes with a
prohibited concentration of alcohol in his body.' 160 Defendant
filed a motion to dismiss, which asserted the complaint "failed to
assert a claim upon which relief could be granted [and the]
court lacked jurisdiction because federal law preempted the
state law claims."'' The trial court granted defendant's motion
and plaintiff appealed. 162
On appeal, the Ohio Third Appellate District considered the
general issue of federal preemption before turning its analysis to
49 U.S.C. §§ 41713 and 42121(a)(1). 16 3 The Wendell H. Ford
Aviation Investment and Reform Act for the 21st Century added
section 42121 to the Federal Aviation Act.164 This section cre-
ated the Whistleblower Protection Program, which prohibited
the firing or disciplining of airline or aviation contractor em-
ployees in response to the employee's reporting of any Federal
Aviation Act violations. 165 Plaintiff maintained that his claim
under the Ohio Whistleblower Act was not related to a price,
route, or service of an airline carrier so that section 41713 was
inapplicable to his claim. 166 Defendant maintained plaintiffs
claim was preempted by virtue of the passage of section
42121 (a) (1).167
The court found that plaintiff's claims under the Ohio statute
were not preempted by the ADA, as the state statute did not
relate to a "service" of an airline carrier. 6 The court looked to
the decision in Branche v. Airtran Airways, Inc.,169 to support its
finding. The Branche decision held that a mechanic's reporting
to the FAA of Airtran's violation of regulations pertaining to
maintenance procedures was not preempted under Section
41713.17° Relying on Branche, the court noted that the plaintiffs
actions in the instant matter had no impact on defendant's ser-
160 Id. at 190.
161 Id.
162 Id.
163 Id. at 194-97.
164 Id. at 192.
165 Id. at 192-93.
166 Id. at 193.
167 Id.
168 Id. at 197.
169 342 F.3d 1248 (11th Cir. 2003).
170 Schumacher, 806 N.E.2d at 194.
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vices. '7 Accordingly, the court held plaintiff's claims under the
Ohio statute fell outside the preemptive effect of section
41713. 172
b. Hoagland v. Town of Clear Lake- Ordinance Regulating
Backyard Heliport Not Preempted by ADA.
In one of the more interesting fact patterns in this area, the
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Indiana consid-
ered whether the ADA preempted a local municipality's efforts
to regulate the operation of a resident's backyard heliport. In
Hoagland v. Town of Clear Lake, 71 the plaintiff and town had a
long running dispute over plaintiffs operation of a heliport
from his backyard. "The history of ill will and litigiousness be-
tween the parties is considerable: [plaintiff] has served multiple
Notices of Tort Claims on Clear Lake (some demanding as
much as $200,000,000), the parties have slugged it out twice in
Indiana state court, and [plaintiff] has now alleged several viola-
tions of his constitutional rights in federal court."' 7 4
At one point, plaintiff even posted on his property a home-
made 'No Trespass' sign warning Clear Lake officials that "'This
land is privately owned by an American national, with sovereign
rights of God the Creator,"' and making the startling claim that
"'Violations of the owners Private Christian, or property
rights . . . shall be assessed a civil penalty of one million dollars
in U.S. Dollars for each violation,'" as well as "'up to ten years in
prison.' 175
As noted in the court's opinion, the federal court action
centers on, of all things, [plaintiff] Hoagland's preferred method
of commuting to work. Hoagland routinely pilots a helicopter
between his home in Clear Lake and his business in Fort Wayne,
Indiana, roughly sixty-one miles away. To that end, his Clear
Lake property includes a heliport, hangar, and two helicopter
landing pads. Over the years, Clear Lake made several attempts
to limit Hoagland's use of these amenities, and Hoagland has
fought them at every step. The feud has now spilled over into
federal court, with Hoagland bringing a flurry of federal constitu-
171 Id. at 196.
172 Id. at 197. For similar matters resulting in the same result, see Nokes v.
Aspen Aviation, Inc., 104 P.3d 247 (Col. Ct. App. 2004); Pohl v. Southeast Air-
lines, Inc., 880 So. 2d 766 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
17" 344 F. Supp. 2d 1150 (N.D. Ind. 2004).
'74 Id. at 1152.
175 Id.
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tional and state-law claims, both for damages and for invalidation
of certain Clear Lake ordinances. 1
76
"On May 8, 2000, Clear Lake began the process of amending
Ordinance 84, the master-zoning ordinance, to cover aircraft
landing areas." 177 "After many months of discussion by the
Town Council and the Plan Commission, Clear Lake adopted
Ordinance 268 . . . [which] designates an '[a]ircraft landing
strip, pad, or space' as a 'special use' requiring special permis-
sion of the Zoning Board of Appeals.' 17 "It also provides that
any preexisting unapproved aircraft landing area must be dis-
continued within five years of the ordinance's passage or upon
transfer of the subject property (whichever comes first), subject
to one exception which is not relevant to this discussion."' 7 9
"In August 2001, Hoagland applied to the Federal Aviation
Administration for a 'Public Use Designation' for his heli-
port.'"18° "According to Hoagland, Clear Lake falsely told the
Administration that a court order prohibited public use of the
heliport, and the Administration denied his application as a
result."'18'
Hoagland filed the federal action in 2003. The parties filed
cross motions for summary judgment on various issues, arguing,
inter alia, that the ADA preempted Ordinance 268.182 In finding
no federal preemption, the district court focused on the effect
of the ordinance. The court found that the ordinance focused
on the regulation of land use rather than the price, route, or
service of plaintiff's helicopter operations. 8 3 "[The ordinances]
amend this master plan by limiting or banning the use of land as
an 'aircraft landing strip, pad, or space.' In other words, the Or-
dinances regulate how Hoagland uses his land, not how he oper-
ates his helicopter; any effect they might have on Hoagland's
prices, routes, or service is tangential."'" 4 The court concluded
that section 41713 did not expressly preempt land use ordi-
nances such as the one at issue in this case. 185
176 Id. at 1152-53.





182 Id. at 1154-55.




The court then addressed plaintiffs field preemption claims.
On this point, Hoagland cited to various decisions regarding
noise ordinances, including Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport
Auth. v. City of Los Angeles,"' to support the argument that land
use regulations that impact on aviation are preempted by virtue
of the pervasive federal regulation of the aviation industry. 87
The court rejected the Burbank line of cases as involving too
broad an interpretation of the Federal Aviation Act. 8 Instead,
the court relied on Gustafson v. City of Lake Angelus,' 9 and simi-
lar decisions to hold that "federal preemption of the airspace
under the [Federal Aviation] Act does not limit the right of lo-
cal governments to designate and regulate aircraft landing
areas."190
c. Levy v. Delta Airlines, Inc.: Refusal to Board Claim Not
Preempted
In Levy v. Delta Airlines, Inc,"' plaintiffs alleged they pur-
chased tickets from Delta for a family trip to Nice, France. "It is
alleged that [the father] asked an agent of Delta what papers
were needed for a flight to France, and that, upon hearing that
Levy was bringing a three-month-old son born in the United
States, the Delta agent said that only a birth certificate or other
proof of birth would be needed."'19 2
"The Levys arrived at the Delta check-in counter on April 17,
2001.' 9 A Delta supervisor . . . refused to allow the infant son,
Jacques, on the plane because he did not have a passport, or any
other official documentation for travel to France.' It was neces-
sary for the family to reschedule their trip for the next day, in
order to allow them to obtain proper documentation for Jac-
ques."' 9  Plaintiffs assert that the plane was overbooked, notJac-
ques's lack of a passport, which was the reason for not allowing
Jacques to travel.' 96
186 979 F.2d 1338 (9th Cir. 1992).
187 Hoagland, 344 F. Supp. 2d at 1156-57.
188 Id. at 1157-58.
189 76 F.3d 778 (6th Cir. 1996).
190 Hoagland, 344 F. Supp. 2d at 1158 (citing Gustafson, 76 F.3d at 790).
I' C1V.A.02-4777(TPG), 2004 WIL 2222149 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2004).
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Delta asserted that it provided the ticket insert to each Delta
ticketed passenger in and about April 2000.197 "The ticket insert
included a 'Notice of Incorporated Terms,' which stated:
"[f] oreign air transportation is governed by applicable tariffs on
file with the U.S. and other governments, which tariffs are
herein incorporated by law and made part of the contract of
carriage. '
During April 2000, Delta had in effect Tariff Rule 45, which
provided:
(B) PASSPORTS AND VISAS
(1) EACH PASSENGER DESIRING TRANSPORTATION
ACROSS ANY INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY WILL BE RE-
SPONSIBLE FOR OBTAINING ALL NECESSARY TRAVEL
DOCUMENTS AND FOR COMPLYING WITH ALL GOVERN-
MENT TRAVEL REQUESTS.
(D) GOVERNMENT REGULATION
NO LIABILITY SHALL ATTACH TO CARRIER IF CARRIER IN
GOOD FAITH DETERMINES THAT WHAT IT UNDERSTANDS
TO BE APPLICABLE LAW, GOVERNMENT REGULATION, DE-
MAND, ORDER OR REQUIREMENT, REQUIRES THAT IT RE-
FUSE AND IT DOES REFUSE TO CARRY A PASSENGER. 199
"After refusing to transport the Levys on April 17, Delta
agreed to put them on the flight to Nice the following evening,
if they obtained the proper travel documents for Jacques. '"200
Plaintiffs arrived at the airport on April 18, 2000, apparently
with a lawful travel document for Jacques. 211 "However, accord-
ing to the Levys, Delta did not have seats for them on the Delta
plane, but referred the Levys to the Air France ticket counter,
where they were left to fend for themselves. '20 2 In contrast,
Delta's records reflect that it booked the Levys on Delta flight
number 82 on April 18.208 In addition, Delta maintained that
"difficulties in seating the Levys on April 18 resulted from com-
plying with a regulation requiring infants to have access to oxy-










additional oxygen mask for an infant per row of seats Delta
could not seat both Levy infants in the same row.20 5
Plaintiffs sued Delta for their travel difficulties. "The allega-
tions of wrongdoing against Delta relating to the above matters
are the basis of Count One of the complaint, claiming negli-
gence, and Count Two, claiming breach of contract. "206
The district court analyzed whether the ADA preempted
plaintiffs' claims. Citing to the U.S. Supreme Court decision in
Wolens, the court stated that " [t] he Supreme Court has held that
the ADA does not preempt state-law based adjudication of rou-
tine breach-of-contract claims, so long as courts confine them-
selves to enforcing the parties' bargain. 2 7 Finding that the
plaintiffs were attempting to enforce a private agreement with
Delta, the court held the ADA did not preempt the breach of
contract claim. 2 8 Turning to the tort claims, the court found in
a similar fashion those claims were not preempted, as they did
not relate to an issue regarding price, route, or service of an
airline.2 °9
d. Alshrafi v. American Airlines, Inc.: Claims for Racial
Discrimination and Intentional Infliction of
Emotional Distress
In Alshrafi v. American Airlines, Inc.,210 plaintiff sued American
and the captain who refused to permit him to board a flight
from Boston to Los Angeles. Plaintiff, who is an Arab-American
and a Muslim, contended the refusal was motivated by unlawful
discrimination while the pilot counters the decision was based
on legitimate security purposes.2 1 American removed plaintiffs
state court action to federal court based on diversity jurisdiction
and, alternatively, on federal question jurisdiction as the resolu-
tion of plaintiff's claims depends upon a resolution of the Fed-
eral Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. section 44902 and the ADA, section
41713.212 American moved for summary judgment shortly
thereafter contending plaintiff's state tort law claims were pre-
205 Id.
206 Id.
207 Id. at *3 (citing Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 228 (1995)).
208 Id. at *4.
209 Id. at *5.
210 321 F. Supp. 2d 150 (D. Mass. 2004).
211 Id. at 152.
212 Id. at 153-54.
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empted under section 41713 as the refusal to board is a decision
regarding airline "service. '"213
After analyzing the jurisdictional aspects of the removed case,
the district court turned its attention to the issue of preemption.
The court focused its analysis on whether the state claims for
discrimination and intentional infliction of emotional distress
related to airline rates, routes or services and, if so, whether
their relationship is too tenuous, remote or peripheral to war-
rant preemption.2 14 Citing to Wolens and Morales, the court ex-
plored the various decisions that interpreted the word "services"
as used in section 41713, noting the divergence the meaning
applied. 215 The court adopted the reasoning from Doricent v.
American Airlines, Inc.,2 16 to find no preemption. The court con-
cluded that "racial and religious [discrimination] and the inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress bear [no] relation to the
legitimate preservation of airline security" under Section
44902(b) and are thus not preempted by the ADA.217
B. FEDERAL AVIATION ACT OF 1958
1. Hughes v. Crist: Preemption Claims Unclear for Drunken Pilots
As an update to the Hughes v. 11th Judicial Circuit of Florida,218 a
case reported in 2003, the Eleventh Circuit ruled in July 2004
that the district court should have refrained from deciding
whether federal aviation law preempted state criminal charges
against two America West pilots who attempted takeoff while
under the influence of alcohol.2 19 While the district court had
ruled. in favor of both pilots, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit ruled that the preemption claims were not
"facially conclusive. 220
Officials smelled alcohol on pilots Christopher Hughes and
Thomas Cloyd on July 1, 2002, before they entered the cockpit
on an America West flight.221 Prior to takeoff, ground control
ordered the pilots to taxi back to the gate; they subsequently
213 Id. at 156.
214 Id. at 156-59.
215 Id. at 157-58; see supra notes 105, 108.
216 Doricent v. Am. Airlines, Inc., No. CIV. A.91-120844, 1993 WL 437670 (D.
Mass. Oct. 19, 1993).
217 Alshrafi, 321 F. Supp. 2d at 162.
218 274 F. Supp. 2d 1334 (S.D. Fla. 2003).
219 Hughes v. Crist, 377 F.3d 1258, 1260 (11th Cir. 2004).
220 Id. at 1260-61.
221 Id. at 1260.
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failed breathalyzer tests. 2 2  The police charged Hughes and
Cloyd "with operating an aircraft while intoxicated, operating a
vehicle while intoxicated, and culpable negligence under Flor-
ida state law. ' 22' Before their criminal trial in Florida state
court, the court denied their motions to dismiss based on fed-
224eral preemption. Upon petition for writ of habeas corpus in
the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida, the
court quashed the state criminal proceedings and enjoined the
state of Florida from taking any further action in the matter.22 5
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit considered field preemption
and express preemption in reaching its decision.
The Eleventh Circuit noted that "while Congress and the
[Federal Aviation Administration] have enacted [a number of]
statutes and regulations . . .governing pilot qualifications and
safety, field preemption is based on the inference that the entire
field has been occupied, leaving no room for state supplementa-
tion. ' 226 The appellate court reasoned:
There are indications in congressional statutes and in the FAA's
regulations that it was contemplated that state statutes would op-
erate affecting the precise conduct at issue in this case. There-
fore, we cannot say it is facially conclusive that appellees are
entitled to the inference that there was no room left for state
supplementation of the relevant field.2 7
Accordingly, the appellate court determined that for that rea-
son, the district court should have abstained from hearing the
pilots' claims.2
While the district court had concluded that "express preemp-
tion of the relevant Florida criminal statutes was readily appar-
ent" and would provide sufficient basis for the district court to
hear the pilots' claims despite the appellate court's ruling on
field preemption, the Eleventh Circuit observed that the chal-
lenged Florida statutes did not necessarily cover the same sub-
ject matter as the federal regulations at issue. 229 The appellate
court also recognized that the regulations contemplate that
"state law enforcement officers will investigate suspected viola-
222 Id. at 1260-61.
223 Id. at 1261.
224 Id.
22.5 Id.
226 Id. at 1271.
227 Id.
228 Id.
229 Id. at 1273.
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tions of state and local laws sanctioning airline crew members
acting under the influence of alcohol or while having 0.04% by
weight or more of alcohol in the blood."23 The panel con-
cluded that there is an obvious tension between the regulations
and the position of the pilots. 231
2. Shupert v. Continental Airlines Inc.: Injury by Falling
Crutch
A New York Federal Judge held in April 2004 that a Continen-
tal Airlines Inc. passenger struck in the neck and back by a
metal crutch that fell from an overhead compartment may re-
cover damages from the carrier and ruled that federal aviation
law does not preempt the plaintiffs action.23 2 After a Continen-
tal flight landed at Orlando International Airport in Florida, a
crutch belonging to another passenger fell from an overhead
bin hitting the plaintiff on the back and neck and injuring
her.233 In her suit filed in the U.S. District Court for the South-
ern District of New York, plaintiff alleged that Continental Air-
lines' negligence was the proximate cause of her injuries.234
In its motion for summary judgment, Continental argued that
the plaintiffs claim was barred by the Federal Aviation Act of
1958 ("FAA"), amended by the Airline Deregulation Act
("ADA"). 23 5 Continental maintained that the implied preemp-
tive effect of the FAA is independent from the express provi-
sions of the ADA.236 Citing Abdullah v. American Airlines Inc.,23 7
the U.S. District Court denied Continental's motion. Judge
Lawrence McKenna opined,
Consistent with Abdullah. .. the plaintiff may still seek state rem-
edies for her injuries. Indeed, in addition to its saving clause,
which specifically mentions remedies, [the Federal Aviation Act]
contains provisions expressly requiring an air carrier to maintain
liability insurance to cover claims for 'bodily injury to, or death
of, an individual . . . resulting from the operation or mainte-
nance of the aircraft.' 238
230 Id.
231 Id.
232 Shupert v. Cont'l Airlines Inc., No. CIV.A.00-2743-LMM, 2004 WL 784859,
*1, *6 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 12, 2004).
233 Id. at *1.
234 Id.
235 Id. at *4.
236 Id.
237 181 F.3d 363, 368-71 (3d Cir. 1999).
238 Shupert, 2004 WL 784859, at *6.
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Judge McKenna explained that, "[a]s a result, the [c]ourt's
holding of federal preemption does not prevent the possibility
that Shupert may recover a state damage remedy."239
Judge McKenna further noted that Continental is not pro-
tected from liability as a matter of law by the delay after the fel-
low passenger opened the overhead bin, and without regard to
who was involved in the incident (i.e., passenger or crew).24
Continental's alleged failure to supervise passengers as they re-
moved baggage from the compartments may be found to be in
violation of the federal safety standard, the court ruled.2 "' "Be-
cause the flight crew knew that the crutches-potentially un-
wieldy items-were in the overhead bin, and because it is
reasonably foreseeable that passengers will unsafely grab for
items overhead, Shupert's allegations and evidence raise an is-
sue of fact appropriate for consideration by a jury. 242
3. Bonano v. East Caribbean Airline Corp.: No Private Right
of Action
The court in Bonano v. East Caribbean Airline Corp.,243 decided
a putative class action suit that was brought by an airline ticket
passenger against a charter airline, an airport and others, alleg-
ing that (1) chartered flights were canceled without giving the
purchasers notice and without refunding their money; (2) that
the airline did not maintain a separate account for each charter
flight; and (3) that it failed to have a bond approved and ac-
cepted by the ICC, all in violation of the FAA and its charter
regulations. The First Circuit affirmed the district court's dis-
missal of the action, holding that neither the FAA nor its imple-
menting regulations created an implied private right of
action.244
4. Williams v. Midwest Express Airlines, Inc.: No Basis for
Removal Jurisdiction
A federal judge for the U.S. District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of Wisconsin held in April 2004 that a federal district court
239 Id.
240 Id. at *8.
241 Id.
242 Id.
243 365 F.3d 81 (1st Cir. 2004) (ruling that FAA could coexist with state dam-
age remedies without undoing the federal regulatory scheme, such that plaintiffs
could potentially recover under state remedies).
244 Id. at 86.
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lacked federal question jurisdiction to rule on state law claims
alleging that a Midwest Express Airlines, Inc. had unjustifiably
excluded two passengers from a flight.245 On an August 2001
flight from Milwaukee to New York City, members of the band,
the Ojays, alleged that the defendant falsely accused the plain-
tiffs of staring at a flight attendant, after which she asked them
to leave the aircraft and had the sheriffs deputies meet plaintiffs
at the gate.246 Defendants argued that the plaintiffs' state law
claims were removable because the Federal Aviation Act
("FAA") and/or the Airline Deregulation Act completely pre-
empted them. 247 District Judge Adelman ruled, however, that
the FAA, which prohibits air carriers from unreasonably discrim-
inating against passengers, does not contain a cause of action
encompassing plaintiffs' claims; thus, the statutes were not com-
pletely preemptive. 248 He further ruled that although the pas-
sengers' right to relief appeared to hinge on whether the carrier
violated a federal statute that allows carriers to refuse transporta-
tion for safety reasons, the statute provided no federal rem-
edy.249 Accordingly, the presence of a claimed violation of the
statute as an element of a state cause of action does not confer
federal question jurisdiction. 250 Last, Judge Adelman deter-
mined that the carrier failed to argue that the federal statutes
imply a private cause of action and removal of the action to fed-
eral court was improper.25'
V. FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT
The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) generally permits claims
against the United States for damages:
245 Williams v. Midwest Express Airlines, Inc., 315 F. Supp. 2d 975, 981 (E.D.
Wis. 2004).
246 Id. at 977.
247 Id. at 979.
248 Id.
249 Id. at 980.
250 Id.
251 Id. at 980-81. (Determining that removal based on diversity jurisdiction was
proper). However, on June 9, 2004, the court subsequently held plaintiffs' state
law tort claims for emotional distress were preempted under section 41713. Wil-
liams v. Midwest Express Airlines, Inc., 321 F. Supp. 2d 993, 996 (E.D. Wis. 2004).
After analyzing the U.S. Supreme Court decisions in Morales and Wolens, and also
the Seventh Circuit's decision in Travel All Over the World v. Kingdom of Saudi Ara-
bia, 73 F.3d 1423 (7th Cir. 1996), the court concluded the tort claims were pre-
empted as they were based on Midwest's refusal to transport the plaintiffs, which
"clearly relate to airline services." Id. at 995-96.
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for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused
by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of
the Government while acting within the scope of his office or
employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a
private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance
with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.252
The FTCA, while broadly waiving sovereign immunity as to
the United States, contains several exceptions to this waiver.
53
The Seventh Circuit held in February 2004, that the United
States government was not liable under the FTCA for damages
arising from the deaths of three passengers aboard a small air-
craft which crashed in Indiana after experiencing icing condi-
tions.254 Specifically, the court found that the Air Traffic
Control Service had no duty to restrain the pilot from taking off
in hazardous weather conditions and that the pilot's negligence
was the proximate cause of the crash.255
In this case, the decedents were traveling from Louisville,
Kentucky, to Aurora, Illinois, in March 1998.256 The aircraft en-
countered icing conditions en route and the pilot attempted an
emergency landing at an airport in New Lebanon, Indiana.2 57
Prior to departure, the pilot informed the Louisville Flight Ser-
vice Station of his intended destination. 25 The weather briefer
provided a weather advisory (AIRMET) that warned of occa-
sional "moderate rain or mixed icing" along the pilot's flight
path to Aurora. 259 Additionally, the weather briefer informed
the pilot that a surface observation along the flight path indi-
cated "light snow and mist and a surface temperature of 2 de-
grees Celsius. '' 211' The pilot also received surface observations
for the Aurora airport which indicated surface temperatures of
2 degrees Celsius and winds at 18 knots with gusts to 26 knots.2 6 1
The pilot further received pilot reports (PIREPs) of actual
weather conditions, three of which reported icing conditions in
Louisville and LaFayette, Indiana.2 5
2
252 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (2002).
253 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (2002).
254 Spurgin-Dienst v. United States, 359 F.3d 451, 455 (7th Cir. 2004).
255 1d.






262 Id. at 453-54.
2005]
198 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [70
After take-off, the pilot requested icing reports for the Evans-
ville, Indiana area.263 The responding controller advised that
there were none in the last two hours.264 This information was
incorrect.265 The pilot then requested icing reports for the
Terre Haute, Indiana control area a.2 6 The responding control-
ler advised that there had not been any for several hours but did
convey earlier reports of icing.26 7
Shortly thereafter, the pilot reported that the aircraft had ac-
cumulated ice and requested permission to land at Terre
Haute.268 Nine minutes later, however, the pilot reported losing
airspeed and requested a closer airport.269 The controller di-
rected the pilot to an airport five miles ahead and advised of two
approaches: VOR-Alpha (circling) or NDB (straight in) .27' The
pilot chose the VOR-Alpha approach and the controller at-
tempted to lead the pilot to the airport.271 The aircraft crashed
five miles from the airport. 72
The Seventh Circuit began its analysis by noting that the Dis-
trict Court identified the correct inquiry under the FTCA and
Indiana law. Specifically, that the plaintiff must show "by the
preponderance of the evidence that some act or omission on
the part of the flight service briefer, or a traffic controller was a
proximate cause of the icing and/or the inability of [the pilot]
to land the plane safely. 2 73
Based on the evidence in the record, the court found that
"[the] Air Traffic Control Service had no duty to restrain [the
pilot] from taking off in hazardous weather" and that the "[dis-
trict] court's conclusion that the [pilot's] decision to fly into
known icing conditions was the proximate cause of the crash
and that nothing government agents on the ground did or did
not do was amply supported by the [evidence] .274
The court acknowledged, however, that the "FAA personnel
committed errors" including "failing to provide [the pilot with]










273 Id. at 455.
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the Area Forecast and the Meteorological Impact Statement
which contained information regarding icing conditions. "275
Additionally, the court noted that the Evansville controller in-
correctly informed the pilot that there had not been any PIREPs
of icing for two hours.2 7 6 However, the court found that the dis-
trict court's conclusion that this information would not have led
the pilot to change course was not clearly erroneous. 277 The
court further found that it was reasonable for the district court
to find that the pilot, due to icing on the plane, could not have
made the VOR approach to the target airport such that nothing
the Terre Haute controller did or did not do contributed to the
accident.27
Another FTCA case decided in 2004, Whittington v. United
States,"79 involved a claim by the children of a deceased pilot
against the United States alleging negligence under Georgia law
where the decedent allegedly relied upon FAA-published erro-
neous information regarding a runway length. The court dis-
missed the plaintiffs lawsuit for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction after the district court determined that the plain-
tiff's allegations regarding the FAA's dissemination of wrongful
information were insufficient to establish jurisdiction.28 °
Rather, the district court noted, that the Airport and Airway Im-
provement Act of 1982 (AAIA) governs the federal funding of
private airports.2"' The Sixth Circuit noted that, "[f] or purposes
of FTCA liability, the AAIA does not create a cause of action nor
does it confer a duty on the FAA to ensure the safety of airports
receiving federal funds. 28 2
In a separate FTCA decision, the Northern District of Illinois
handed down its findings of facts and conclusions of law in the
matter captioned Alinsky v. United States arising from the mid-air
collision of two aircraft over the Chicago lakefront in July
1997."' At a bench trial in January 2004, the court heard evi-




278 Id. at 456.
279 Whittington v. United States, 99 Fed. Appx. 56 (6th Cir. 2004).
280 Id. at *3.
281 Id.
282 Id.
283 No. CIV.A.98-6189, CIV.A.99-1738, C1V.A.99-2447, CIV.A.99-2883, 2004 WL
1588273 (N.D. 11. July 16, 2004).
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1) Whether... the Manager for the Hub that included Chicago's
Meig's Tower properly administered a "practical test" to Midway
Tower Supervisor Doreen Adams before Ms. Adams certified the
independent contractor's air traffic controllers at Meigs Tower[;]
and
2) [W]hether the FAA unreasonably delayed in responding to
the contractor's request for a contract modification to pay for
permanently increased staffing at Meigs Tower, and whether this
allegedly unreasonable delay caused Midwest Air Traffic Control
Services not to be in compliance with the AA order that involves
"Controller-in-Charge" training.2 4
The court issued detailed findings of fact. Specifically, the
court found that there was no FAA order governing staffing
levels for contract towers and that such decisions are within the
discretion of the Contract Tower Program Office.285 Addition-
ally, the court found that the FAA acted reasonably in consider-
ing a non-emergency request to modify the tower contract and
had complete discretion in the staffing matter.286 Finally, the
court found that the FAA never prevented Midwest Air Traffic
Control Services from training its controllers as required by
contract. 287
Accordingly, the court concluded that the United States
"committed no tort against the Plaintiffs under the [FTFCA and
that] the United States has a valid defense that its alleged negli-
gent oversight falls within the discretionary function exception
to the FTCA. 28
VI. FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT
A. DOLE FOOD COMPANY V. PATRICKSON:
No TIERING OF INTERESTS
On April 22, 2003, the United States Supreme Court issued an
opinion styled Dole Food Company v. Patrickson, which has implica-
tions with respect to litigation against foreign air carriers and
foreign aircraft manufacturers in the United States.289 In effect,
many of these air carriers and aircraft manufacturers could pre-
viously invoke certain rights and privileges that the Foreign Sov-
ereign Immunities Act ("FSIA") affords to foreign states.
284 Id. at *1.
285 Id. at *5.
286 Id. at *3.
287 Id. at *6.
288 Id.
289 538 U.S. 468 (2003).
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However, in its opinion, the Supreme Court resolved the split
decisions of appellate courts in favor of a narrow definition that
found that a subsidiary of an "instrumentality" is not entitled to
the protections of FSIA.90
-1
The FSIA, codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1602 et seq., is the only stat-
ute that provides jurisdiction over foreign states and their instru-
mentalities respecting litigation in the United States. 91 Under
FSIA, a foreign state is generally granted immunity unless it
waives such immunity or engages in commercial activities.292 In
such instance, the foreign sovereign may remove an action to
federal court, which the court would try without a jury.293 The
FSIA defines a "foreign state" as:
(a) A "foreign state" . . . includes a political subdivision of a for-
eign state or an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state as
defined in subsection (b).
(b) An "agency or instrumentality of a foreign state" means any
entity-
(1) which is a separate legal person, corporate or otherwise, and
(2) which is an organ of a foreign state or political subdivision
thereof, or a majority of whose shares or other ownership interest
is owned by a foreign state or political subdivision thereof... 294
Prior to Dole, a majority of courts interpreted the definition of
foreign state broadly to include corporations where the majority
state ownership was indirect. For example, in In re Air Crash Dis-
aster Near Roselawn, Indiana, the Seventh Circuit held that a for-
eign aircraft manufacturer indirectly owned by the French and
Italian governments was entitled to have its case heard in federal
court as it was an "agency or instrumentality" under the FSIA.295
Avions de Transport Regional ("ATR") was ajoint enterprise be-
tween the French and Italian governments. Two foreign corpo-
rations, SNIA and Alenia, owned ATR.2%t Through a tiered
structure of companies, the French and Italian governments in-
directly owned approximately 75% of ATR.297 The court rea-
soned that the French and Italian governments exercised
control over ATR through their ownership of the shareholding
290 Id. at 473.
291 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (2002).
292 Id.
29-1 See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(d) (2002).
2 ,4 28 U.S.C. § 1603 (2002).
295 96 F.3d 932, 935 (7th Cir. 1996).
296 Id. at 935-36.
2'1 Id. at 936.
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companies. 298 The court held that the act intended a broad def-
inition of foreign state and that it included a tiered ownership
such as ATR.299 In so holding, it rejected decisions by the Ninth
Circuit that held that the FSIA required a direct ownership in-
terest by a foreign state."'°
Until Dole, the Ninth Circuit's analysis was the minority opin-
ion with respect to the definition of "agency or instrumentality
of a foreign state" in the FSIA. The underlying matter involved
claims by workers against the Dole Food Company alleging in-
jury from exposure to a pesticide manufactured by two compa-
nies referred to as the Dead Sea Companies.30  The Dead Sea
Companies removed the action to federal court on the basis that
they were instrumentalities of Israel.3 2 The Ninth Circuit af-
firmed the lower court's opinion that held that because Israel
did not directly own the Dead Sea Companies, they were not
subject to the FSIA and removal was improper.3
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari, and on
appeal upheld the Ninth Circuit's opinion finding that indirect
subsidiaries are not instrumentalities under the FSIA. °4 The
Dole court reasoned that corporations and its shareholders are
distinct entities and that distinctions in corporate structure were
important.30 5 The court did not find any indication that Con-
gress intended a departure from general corporate law in this
matter.30 6 Further, the Dole court refused to read "other owner-
ship interest" to include a state's interest through the ownership
of shares in a subsidiary or parent corporation.3 °7 It found a
more reasonable interpretation to be an ownership interest
other than stock, which provided flexibility for ownership forms
in foreign countries that depart from conventional corporate
structures.3 0 8 Therefore, the court found that a corporation is
only an instrumentality of a state under the FSIA "if the foreign
state . . . itself owns a majority of the corporation's shares. 30 9
298 Id. at 938.
299 Id. at 941.
300 See, e.g., Gates v. Victor Fine Foods, 54 F.3d 1457 (9th Cir. 1995).
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While the court admitted that certain rare instances may allow a
court to pierce the veil between the corporation and its share-
holders, it did not find any reason to do so in the case at issue. 3 '1
The court further identified that the state's ownership interest is
to be determined when the litigation commences, not when the
conduct occurs."'
B. APPLICATION OF DOLE TO AvIATION MATTERS
1. Wong v. The Boeing Company: China Airlines Not a Foreign
Sovereign
In the context of aviation matters, this decision would seem-
ingly increase the number of foreign air carriers and foreign air-
craft manufacturers that would have their cases heard in state,
rather than federal courts. However, pursuant to the Mul-
tiparty, Multiforum Jurisdiction Act, original federal jurisdiction
exists for litigation that arises out of a single accident in which at
least 75 persons lost their lives and where minimal diversity ex-
ists for accidents on or after November 2, 2002.12 Therefore,
while the trial will be to a jury and not the judge, many foreign
air carriers and foreign manufacturers will be able to have their
cases heard in federal court.
Nevertheless, for matters arising from an event prior to No-
vember 2, 2002, the Dole precedent may result in state court ad-
judication. In Wong v. Boeing Company,'13 third-party defendant,
China Airlines Ltd., removed the litigation pending in state
court to the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illi-
nois based on the Roselawn decision in the Seventh Circuit. The
Republic of China owns the China Aviation Development Foun-
dation which owns 70% of China Airlines. 14 Plaintiff, Wong,
filed a motion to remand the matter back to Cook County (Illi-
nois) Circuit Court.1 15 After briefing the motion but before the
district court rendered a decision, the Supreme Court handed
down the Dole decision.31" After the parties submitted additional
briefing to address Dole, the district court remanded the litiga-
311 Id. at 469.
311 Id.
312 28 U.S.C. § 1369(a) (2002).
313 No. CIV.A.02-7865, 2003 WL 22078379 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 8, 2003) (unre-
ported decision).
3 14 Id. at *1.
315 Id.
316 Id. at *3.
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tion to state court.3 17 The court found that China Airlines was
not directly owned by the Republic of China (Taiwan) 31" There
being no other grounds upon which to premise jurisdiction, the
court remanded the case back to state court.319
2. Coyle v. P.T. Garuda Indonesia: Garuda a Foreign Sovereign
Coyle v. P. T. Garuda Indonesiad2° examined different issues re-
lating to federal jurisdiction under FSIA. This matter arose
from litigation filed in federal district court by representatives of
Oregon residents who died in the Garuda Flight 152 accident
on September 26, 1997 in Indonesia.3 21 The Indonesian govern-
ment wholly owns Garuda, rendering Garuda an "instrumental-
ity" under FSIA. 22  The issues focused on whether two
exceptions to the FSIA would allow the action to proceed which
included: (1) whether Garuda waived its immunity; and (2)
whether FSIA considered the flight a "commercial activity.
323
The lower court found that jurisdiction was proper as the flight
was part of the decedents' international travel under Article
1(3) of the Warsaw Convention and that a provision in Garuda's
U.S. operating permit acted as a waiver of any claim to immunity
for the incident.324 On the air carrier's appeal, the Ninth Cir-
cuit reversed the holding that the flight was a domestic side trip
and thus not governed by the Warsaw Convention or subject to
any immunity in the U.S. operating permit. The court also
held that as it found the flight to be a domestic side trip, it did
not meet 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a) (2), requiring that the foreign




318 Id. at *7.
319 Id.
320 363 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 2004).
321 Id. at 982-83.
322 Id. at 982, n.2.
323 Id. at 984, 993.
324 Id. at 984.
325 Id. at 991-92.
326 Id. at 993-94.
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VII. FORUM NON CONVENIENS
A. ZERMENO V. McDONNELL DoucLAs CoRP.
In Zermeno v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.,'127 a federal judge in
Texas rejected a request to vacate her prior order dismissing the
action on forum non conveniens grounds and ruled that four
family members killed in Mexico when an Aeromexico plane
struck their house may not proceed with a lawsuit in the United
States. In February 2003, U.S. District Judge Lee H. Rosenthal
of the Southern District of Texas had dismissed the action on
forum non conveniens grounds. 23 Zermeno's wife and three of
his children died when an Aeromexico flight ran off the runway
in Mexico and struck the home ofJulioJasso Zermeno on Octo-
ber 6, 2000.29 Zermeno filed suit in Texas state court against
McDonnell Douglas and Boeing, several other corporate de-
fendants, and Aeromexico. 311' Defendants removed the case to
federal court, and Zermeno moved to remand; the defendants
countered with a motion to dismiss on grounds of forum non
conveniens 33' The judge considered the following factors in
granting the defendants' motion: none of the conduct causing
the injury occurred in Texas; the accident occurred in Mexico;
Aeromexico maintained the aircraft in Mexico; relevant wit-
nesses and documents were in Mexico; and the aircraft was
neither designed nor manufactured in Texas.332 According to
Judge Rosenthal, "the differences between American and Mexi-
can substantive and procedural law were not so great as to de-
prive the plaintiffs of any remedy in a Mexican court. 333
After dismissal, plaintiffs obtained documents from the FAA
showing its inspection of the aircraft and argued that U.S. law
would, accordingly, apply and that the court should allow the
case to go forward in the United States.334 The District Court
found that the FAA records were not "new evidence" within the
meaning of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) .15 Moreover,
the evidence would not have affected the outcome of the court's
analysis because there were significant connections between the
327 No. Civ.A.H-02-2862, 2004 WiL 1146192 (S.D. Tex. May 10, 2004).




332 Id. at *1-2.
331 Id. at *2.
334 Id. at *3.
335 Id. at *4, n.1.
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case and the foreign forum that made dismissal under the fo-
rum non conveniens doctrine appropriate.336
B. ANDERSON V. DASSAULT AVIATION
In Anderson v. Dassault Aviation,337 the Eight Circuit held that
Dassault, the French business jet manufacturer, had sufficient
contacts with Arkansas to support the assertion of personal juris-
diction over it in a products liability action. Anderson was hurt
when the company jet experienced a series of pitch oscillations
descending into a Michigan airport.338 Dassault sold the plane,
which it manufactured in France, to its U.S. subsidiary, Dassault
Falcon Jet Corp.3 9 Falcon Jet, headquartered in NewJersey, op-
erates a facility in Arkansas, where it services aircraft according
to customers' specifications such as Amway.340 The U.S. District
Court for the Western District of Michigan had dismissed the
case against Dassault for lack of personal jurisdiction, finding
that Anderson failed to show that Dassault had sufficient con-
tacts in Michigan to fall under the state's long-arm statute.34'
Anderson then filed suit against Dassault in the Eastern District
of Arkansas, with the same result.34 2 On appeal, the Eighth Cir-
cuit overturned the lower court's decision, finding that the ma-
jority of jets sold worldwide by Dassault fly in and out of
Arkansas for consumer specifications at the Falcon Jet facility,
and the manufacturer's annual report listed Arkansas as the
largest production site.343 The court ruled that this was "not a
situation in which Dassault Aviation simply placed the jet at issue
'into the stream of commerce' which fortuitously swept it into
Arkansas. 344
Dassault filed a petition for certiorari from this ruling. 45 An-
derson argued in opposition to U.S. Supreme Court petition
that Dassault is subject to jurisdiction in the United States based
36 Id. at *5.
337 361 F.3d 449 (8th Cir. 2004).
338 Id. at 450.




343 Id. at 453.
344 Id. at 454.
345 Petition for Writ of Centiorari, Dassault Aviation v. Anderson, 2004 WL
1857087 (No. 04-222) [hereinafter Petition for Writ].
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on the activities of its wholly owned U.S. subsidiary.4 ' In its Su-
preme Court Petition, Dassault argued that this case would serve
as an "ideal vehicle for addressing the substantial confusion in
the lower courts.1114 7 The first question centered on the proper
legal standard governing when the forum contacts of one corpo-
ration may be attributed or imputed to an affiliated corporation
(here, a parent company). 4 Dassault insisted that the Eighth
Circuit was "especially in need of correction." '349 Anderson re-
sponded that the Eight Circuit "properly found that petitioner
through its own actions had purposefully directed its products
to the United States, and specifically to Arkansas, where most
Falcon jets are completed, through the distribution system that
the petitioner itself established in this country. '355 Well-settled
law supports the conclusion that the defendant purposefully
availed itself of the privilege of doing business in the Arkansas
forum? 5.
C. IN RE AIR CRASH AT TAIPEI, TAIWAN
The In re Air Crash at Taipei, Taiwan,3 52 litigation arose from
the Singapore Airlines Flight SQ006 crash on departure from
the Chiang Kai-Shek Airport to Los Angeles, California on Octo-
ber 31, 2000. Boeing moved for reconsideration of the district
court's prior refusal to dismiss the case on forum non con-
veniens grounds. 53 The court agreed with Boeing and dis-
missed 13 cases where Article 28 of the Warsaw Convention did
not provide a basis for U.S. jurisdiction. 54
The court noted that Singapore Airlines had conceded liabil-
ity and, accordingly, the court could not simultaneously try the
claims against Singapore and Boeing because to do so would
risk prejudice to both. 55 The court also rejected plaintiffs' ar-
gument "that [the] surviving heirs would want piecemeal settle-
346 Brief for Respondent, Dassault Aviation v. Anderson, 2004 WL 2363743
(No. 04-222) [hereinafter Brief for Respondent].
347 Id. at *2.
348 Id.
349 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 345, at *4.
350 Brief for Respondent, supra note 346, at *3.
351 Id.
32 No. CIV.A.01-1394 GAF (RCX), 2004 WIL 1234131 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 2004).
353 Id. at * 1.
354 Id. at *2.
355 Id. at *1, *3.
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ments to ensure that all wrongdoers have made peace with the
plaintiffs." '356
The court distinguished these facts from the TWA 800 and
Silk Air disasters, in which the court noted that they presented
serious airworthiness questions and that Canada, Singapore and
Taiwan were adequate for litigating the claims at issue, due to
private and public interest factors.357
D. SUN V. SINGAPORE AIRLINES LTD.
In March 2004, the Cook County Circuit Court dismissed the
wrongful-death and personal-injury actions stemming from the
October 2000 crash of a Singapore Airlines jet at Taipei, Taiwan
based on forum non conveniens grounds. 358 The plaintiffs filed
claims of wrongful death, personal injury, and loss of consor-
tium based on negligence and strict product liability. 359 Defen-
dant moved to dismiss, submitting that it would consent to the
jurisdiction of the Taiwan courts; treat as tolled any statute of
limitations under Taiwan law for any plaintiff within six months
of the forum non conveniens dismissal; make evidence available
for trial in Taiwan; and pay any damages subject to the right of
appeal. 6 °
The court found "that the statutes and laws governing a Tai-
wan court will provide a sufficient alternative forum convenient
to all parties." '3 6 1 While the plaintiffs argued that the high cost of
litigation in Taiwan warranted maintaining the matter in a U.S.
court, the judge said this factor does not render a forum inade-
quate, "especially since the evidence here indicates that Taiwan
has procedural and substantive laws governing Plaintiffs' cause
of action from which they may seek a remedy.31 6 2 The court
further found that the private and public interest factors
strongly favored dismissal, observing that since all plaintiffs
were residents of Taiwan, and SIA is a Singapore corporation,
the court found "no convenience to maintain this cause of ac-
tion in the United States, much less Cook County, Illinois, for
356 Id. at *3.
357 Id. at *5-6.
358 Sun v. Sing. Airlines, Ltd., No. CIV.A.02-L-13640, 2004 WL 601953, at *1
(Ill. Cir. Ct. Mar. 19, 2004).
359 Id.
360 Id. at *1.




either Plaintiffs or SIA."' 63 The plaintiffs argued that because
Boeing, the manufacturer of the plane, headquartered in Chi-
cago, the Illinois court was the proper forum." 4 However, the
court did not agree because it found that Boeing had not been
served and that evidence on the design and performance of the
plane was in Seattle."" Finally, the judge found that, "[w]hile
aviation safety may be of universal concern, the facts and cir-
cumstances surrounding this particular litigation, is not."'3 66
The court found that: (1) SIA, a foreign corporation, owned the
subject aircraft; (2) this matter did not involve American plain-
tiffs; and (3) "the accident from which this litigation arose oc-
curred in Taiwan." '367 "Thus, Cook County residents had
minimal interest, if any at all, in resolving this litigation. 6 As
such, the [court found] that burdening Cook County re-
sidents ... with the duty of resolving a matter with no nexus to
the accident aircraft is inequitable." '69
E. IN RE AIR CRASH OVER THE TAIWAN STRAIT ON
MAY 25, 2002
A California federal judge ruled in July 2004 that Taiwan was
a suitable alternative forum for wrongful-death cases arising
from a May 2002 crash and that, because the defendants had
stipulated to liability if the court dismissed the cases, the private
and public interest factors favored dismissal.3Y° The dismissal
from the U.S. court came with a number of conditions imposed
on the defendants, China Airlines Ltd. and The Boeing Co. 7 '
All 225 persons aboard the China Air Flight CI-611, a Boeing
747-200 aircraft, en route from Taipei, Taiwan, to Hong Kong,
died. 7 2 Approximately 35,000 feet over the Pacific Ocean,
roughly midway between the Chinese mainland and Taiwan, the
plane suffered an unknown structural failure, broke apart and








370 In reAjr Crash over the Taiwan Strait on May 25, 2002, 331 F. Supp. 2d 1176
(C.D. Cal. 2004).
371 Id.
372 Id. at 1179.
373 Id.
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District Court for the Central District of California against Boe-
ing and China Airlines.17 1 "Both defendants moved to dismiss
all but three of the actions on forum non conveniens
grounds. '3 v5 In her ruling, U.S. DistrictJudge Margaret M. Mor-
row ruled that the courts of Taiwan would provide an adequate
remedy.3 76 The court found that Taiwan courts had jurisdiction
over defendants, and that plaintiffs' claims are cognizable even
though plaintiffs would not be able to rely on a strict products
liability theory in Taiwan. 77 The court further found that argu-
ments regarding the availability of contingency fee contracts
and material discovery as well as concern about filing fees did
not warrant a finding that Taiwan's procedural safeguards were
inadequate. 78
Citing Boeing and China Airlines' earlier agreement to com-
pensate fully the plaintiffs in the country of their decedents'
domicile if the court dismissed the claims on forum non con-
veniens grounds, Judge Morrow said the court need not decide
whether it could require the plaintiffs to accept the stipulation
to liability.3 7 9 "Should the court determine that dismissal is ap-
propriate and condition dismissal on defendants' tendering of
the proffered stipulation," Judge Morrow found that the, "plain-
tiffs are free to argue to the Taiwanese court that they should
not be required to accept the stipulation.3 8 0 Judge Morrow
concluded that the private interest factors, including "ease of
access to proof and the amenability of witnesses to compulsory
process . . .all weigh in favor of a finding that Taiwan is the
more convenient forum.""3 She further determined that the
public interest factor of court congestion "is either neutral or
weighs slightly in favor of trial of the cases in Taiwan. 31 8 2 Like-
wise, the court found that the "localization of the controversy,
preliminary choice of law analysis, and the burden on potential
jurors all weigh heavily in favor of Taiwan. '"383 While the fact
that two plaintiffs brought cases under Article 28 of the Warsaw
Convention weighed slightly in favor of the U.S. forum, the
374 Id.
375 Id.
376 Id. at 1186.
377 Id. at 1185.
378 Id. at 1187.
379 Id. at 1192.
380 Id.
381 Id. at 1201.
382 Id. at 1212.
383 Id.
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judge concluded that on balance, the public interest factors
strongly favored dismissal.38 4 Plaintiffs are appealing the court's
decision.
The dismissal leaves open the possibility of U.S. domiciled
plaintiffs refiling in the United States. The court conditioned
the dismissal, however, on defendants: (1) not contesting liabil-
ity for compensatory damages; (2) submitting to jurisdiction in
the alternative jurisdiction; (3) waiving any applicable statute of
limitations for 180 days from the date of the order; (4) waiving
any limitation on compensatory damages for those cases gov-
erned by Article 28 of the Warsaw Convention that stayed in the
court; (5) providing access to evidence; (6) paying for costs of
translation from English to Mandarin Chinese as necessary; and
(7) allowing refiling if the defendants failed to comply with con-
ditions one through six or if other alternative courts declined to
take jurisdiction. 85
F. PORTILLO V. ROBINSON HELICOPTER Co.
In June 2004, the California Supreme Court denied the peti-
tion of Robinson Helicopter Co. to review a ruling that a crash
case belongs in the U.S. courts and not in El Salvador, where the
accident occurred and the plaintiffs reside.38 6 Plaintiffs, Salva-
doran citizens and the personal representatives of the estates of
two brothers who died in a helicopter crash in El Salvador,
brought an action in California against the California manufac-
turers of the helicopter, alleging that the crash occurred due to
the failure of a main rotor blade. 87
The plaintiffs submitted that the evidence supporting the
claims was located in the U.S. and that expert witnesses on heli-
copter design, manufacturing and other technical issues were
U.S. citizens testifying and referring to documents in English. 8
Defendant moved the trial court to dismiss or stay the action on
forum non conveniens grounds. 9 In support of the motion, de-
fendant noted that although the aircraft was manufactured in
California, the case should be tried in El Salvador for many rea-
sons: the accident occurred there; all aspects of the flight were
384 Id.
315 Id. at 1213.
386 Estate of Portillo v. Robinson Helicopter Co., No. CIV.A.B168057, 2004 WL
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subject to Salvadoran air regulations; the decedents were citi-
zens and residents of El Salvador; nearly all potential co-defend-
ants were citizens and organizations of El Salvador; and nearly
all witnesses resided in that country. 9 ° The California Appellate
Court found that El Salvador did not provide a suitable alterna-
tive forum. 9 However, because there was no evidence that the
defendant would be subject to personal jurisdiction in El Salva-
dor, there was no indication that the action in El Salvador would
not be barred by the statute of limitations, and further, docu-
ments were submitted indicating that there were no rules in El
Salvador's judicial system to determine the rights of decedents'
relatives.3 92
G. IN RE AIRCRASH NEAR NANTUCKET ISLAND, MASSACHUSETTS
ON OCTOBER 31, 1999
In In re Aircrash Near Nantucket Island, Massachusetts on October
31, 1999, a federal judge in New York denied EgyptAir's motion
to dismiss the claims of Egyptian and Canadian domiciliaries
stemming from a 1999 crash off Nantucket Island based on fo-
rum non conveniens grounds. 93 EgyptAir Flight 990, a Boeing
767 en route from New York to Cairo, Egypt, went down on Oc-
tober 31, 1999, approximately 65 miles off the Nantucket
coast. 94 All persons on board the plane were killed. 9 5 The air-
line argued that the suits did not belong in the U.S. court based
on evidence it presented that Egyptian and Canadian courts
would have jurisdiction over the manufacturers.396 The court
drew an "adverse inference" as to the credibility and qualifica-
tions of EgyptAir's expert on Egyptian law, but held that it
would nevertheless have denied EgyptAir's motion, finding that
EgyptAir had failed to meet its burden of showing Egypt or Ca-
nada were appropriate fora.3 9 7
390 Id.
391 Id. at *3.
392 Id. at *2-3.
393 In re Air Crash Near Nantucket Island, Mass. on Oct. 31, 1999, No. MDL-
1344, 2004 WL 1824385 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 16, 2004).
394 Id.
395 Id.
396 Id. at *6-7.
397 Id. at *6, 8.
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H. MCCAFFERTY V. RAYTHEON, INC.
The case of McCafferty v. Raytheon, Inc. involved a denial of
defendants' motions to dismiss based on forum non con-
veniens"' The court held that, although the crash occurred in
Indonesia, plaintiffs premised their theory of recovery on the
manufacture and sale of the allegedly defective aircraft and en-
gine, which occurred in the U.S. 9 '-
I. LIE V. BOEING Co.
The court in Lie v. Boeing Co.4"' granted Garuda's FNC motion
as to the claims asserted by The Boeing Company and CFM In-
ternational. This action arose out of a January 16, 2002 emer-
gency landing in the Bengawan Solo River, Indonesia.41
Plaintiff filed the action originally in Illinois state court.4"2 De-
fendants removed the case to federal court after they added
Garuda as a third-party defendant.4 "' Defendants/third-party
plaintiffs asserted in their removal petition that Garuda was a
foreign instrumentality under the Foreign Sovereign Immuni-
ties Act." 4 The Federal District Court remanded the plaintiffs'
claims and retained only the third party claims against Garuda,
which it then dismissed.40 5
J. VAN SCI-lJNDEL v. BOEING Co.
The estate ofJohannes Van Schijndel, killed in the 2000 crash
of a Singapore Airlines jet in Taiwan, argued in a Ninth Circuit
brief that claims against Boeing and Goodrich Corp. involving
safety and evacuation equipment should not have been dis-
missed on forum non conveniens grounds.0 6 The airplane, en
route from Taiwan to Los Angeles on October 31, 2000, hit con-
struction equipment and burst into flames while taking off on
the wrong runway.4° 7 The U.S. District Court for the Central
398 McCafferty v. Raytheon, Inc., No. CIV.A.03-6729, CV.A.03-6730, CIV.A.03-
6731, 2004 WL 1858080, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 19, 2004).
399 Id. at *3.
400 No. CIV.A.04-C2460, 2004 WL 1462451, at *2 (N.D. i11. Jun. 29, 2004).
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District of California, on reconsideration, granted Boeing and
Goodrich's motion to dismiss on February 6, 2004, finding that
the admission of liability by Singapore Airlines in an unrelated
group of cases mandated the reversal.4a 8
On appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,
plaintiffs contended that Boeing and Goodrich never initiated
any third-party action against Singapore Airlines and no such
actions had been instituted against Boeing and Goodrich.40 9
The plaintiffs argued:
The basic reason is that the actions in the case at bar, while hav-
ing the crash as a catalyst, are purely and simply actions dealing
with separate and distinct issues arising from a basic proposition
- if the fuel containment systems, fire protection systems, doors
and emergency evacuation slides designed and produced in
America by Boeing and Goodrich did not malfunction Johannes
Van Schijndel would have survived the crash.410
The plaintiffs also argued that the district court abused its dis-
cretion in finding that Singapore Airlines' admission required
reversal of its prior opinion and submitted that the trial judge's
original ruling was correct in that the balance of public and pri-
vate factors "did not tilt strongly in favor of Singapore as the
forum for the trial of this American product liability case." '411
The brief declared that the court based its reversal of this posi-
tion on "hypothetical assumptions that cannot provide support
for a sound forum non conveniens determination." '412 The
plaintiffs further maintained that the district court mischaracter-
ized their product liability claims against Boeing and Goodrich
as ones concerning the ability of an aircraft to resist the striking
of construction equipment on the runway, the broad hypotheti-
cal assumption that plaintiffs will receive full compensation in
their case against Singapore Airlines from the Singapore courts
which would extinguish the right to seek any more compensa-
tion from Boeing and Goodrich, and that the issues to be tried
in this case are wholly different from those air crashes where









VIII. GENERAL AVIATION REVITALIZATION ACT
The General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994 ("GARA"), 41 4
is a tort reform measure that imposes an eighteen-year statute of
repose for general aviation aircraft and new components that
replace original components therein.4 15 The statute contains an
explicit exception, commonly referred to as the "knowing mis-
representation or concealment or withholding" exception, ren-
dering the statute of repose inapplicable where the defendant
knowingly misrepresents to, or conceals from, the Federal Avia-
tion Administration ("FAA") required information that is mate-
rial and relevant to the operation of the aircraft or system
thereof and causally related to the harm claimant suffered.41"
Case law over the past year examined the applicability of the
"knowing misrepresentation or concealment or withholding" ex-
ception, illustrated that the statute of repose may not apply to
supplemental instructions or manuals issued after the original
manufacture, and refined the analysis as to GARA's "new part"
provision.4
17
Robinson v. Hartzell Propeller Inc.411 involved a claim against a
manufacturer and maintenance provider of a propeller,
wherein plaintiffs alleged negligent design and maintenance of
the propeller, strict liability, and fraud. With regard to their
fraud claim, plaintiffs alleged that defendant Hartzell, the pro-
peller's manufacturer, knew of the propeller's design defects
and misrepresented the engine/propeller vibration problems
and their resulting failures to the FAA, thereby falling within the
"knowing misrepresentation or concealment or withholding" ex-
ception and rendering the statute of repose inapplicable.4 19 Al-
though the propeller was manufactured and installed by
Hartzell in 1974, plaintiffs argued that under GARA's "new part"
provision the repose period either began in 1984 when Hartzell
issued an overhaul manual or in 1989 when the propeller was
actually overhauled. 42
In a lengthy decision, the United States District Court for the
District of Pennsylvania concluded that plaintiffs had submitted
4 General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-298, 108 Stat.
1552 (reprinted in notes for 49 U.S.C. § 40101).
415 Id. § 2(a).
416 Id. § 2(b) (1).
417 Id. § 2(a) (2).
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sufficient evidence to create genuine issues of material fact and
thereby survive summary judgment with respect to whether
Hartzell made material misrepresentations to the FAA that were
causally related to plaintiffs' injuries.4 21 Specifically, plaintiffs
offered expert testimony, letters Hartzell sent to the FAA, and
Hartzell's own accident reports in support of their argument
that Hartzell blamed other factors instead of disclosing the true
cause, the propeller/engine vibration problem, to the FAA.422
Therefore, the court held that plaintiffs established sufficient ev-
idence to satisfy each element of GARA's § 2(b) (1) "knowing
misrepresentation or concealment or withholding" exception.423
However, the court held that plaintiffs' experts could not testify
on the subjective intent of the Hartzell employees in making the
subject representations to the FAA because intent is not the
proper subject for expert testimony under Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 702.424 Finally, reasoning that GARA's statute of repose
cannot be avoided by recasting a claim based on negligent com-
ponent design as a negligence claim based on a maintenance
manual's failure to warn, the court rejected plaintiffs' argu-
ments that the 1984 overhaul manual was causally related to the
accident and therefore that its issuance restarted the GARA
clock.425
In the unpublished decision Hinkle v. Cessna Aircraft Com-
pany,4 26 the Michigan Court of Appeals upheld the summary
judgment dismissal of the fuel pump manufacturer and the en-
gine manufacturer but reversed the lower court's dismissal of
the airplane manufacturer. Hinkle involved the failure of the
subject aircraft's right engine driven fuel pump, which was man-
ufactured in 1972, more than eighteen years prior to the 1995
accident.427 Plaintiff argued that, since the fuel pump is an inte-
gral part of the engine, a failure of the fuel pump is tantamount
to failure of the engine itself and the court should hold the en-
gine's manufacturer liable for the failure of the component
part.428 The court rejected this argument on the basis that
421 Id. at 652.
422 Id. at 655.
423 Id. at 654.
424 Id. at 648.
425 Id. at 661-62.
426 No. CIV.A.247099, 2004 Mich. App. LEXIS 2894, at *12 (Mich. Ct. App.
Oct. 28, 2004) (per curiam).
427 Id. at *2.
428 Id. at *22.
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adopting plaintiff's reasoning would effectively permit the plain-
tiff to circumvent the GARA statue of repose by allowing plain-
tiff to bring suit against any manufacturer of a part when a sub-
part that is the actual cause of the accident was replaced or ad-
ded to the original part, even if the original part was over eigh-
teen years of age.4"' The court emphasized that the proper
focus is on the component that actually causes the crash, not the
larger part that encompasses many smaller components, one of
which was the allegedly deficient part.4"'
The court also rejected plaintiff's argument that the GARA
statute of repose should not apply to the engine or the fuel
pump manufacturers because the fuel pump was overhauled less
than two years prior to the crash, thus "rolling" the GARA stat-
ute.43' The court stated that the plain language of the statute
dictates that GARA's eighteen year period of repose is only
rolled if a "new" part replaces an old part or is added to the
aircraft and if the "new" part is alleged to have caused the acci-
dent.43 2 The mere "overhaul" of a part does not render it "new"
for purposes of GARA.43
However, the Michigan Court of Appeals reversed the lower
court's dismissal of the aircraft manufacturer finding that plain-
tiff satisfied the elements of GARA's "knowing misrepresenta-
tion or concealment or withholding" exception.434 The court
found that the plaintiff produced sufficient evidence that the
manufacturer had submitted certification test results to the FAA
that contained knowing misrepresentations as to the aircraft's
ability to fly safely with one inoperable engine.4 5 Furthermore,
the court found that the evidence showed that defendant's mis-
representations directly related to the cause of the accident be-
cause the allegedly misrepresented data was included in the
plane's pilot's operating handbook, upon which the pilot had
relied for performance expectations.436
Finally, the Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed the lower
court's denial of plaintiff's motion to vacate the dismissal of the
aircraft manufacturer on the basis that plaintiff's decedent alleg-
429 Id. at *23.
430 Id. at *23-24.
431 Id. at *25-26.
432 Id. at *27.
433 Id. at *29.
434 Id. at *38.
435 Id. at *35.
436 Id. at *37.
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edly utilized a 1985 supplemental manual which, plaintiff ar-
gued, constituted a "part" of the aircraft for purposes of
GARA.4 7 Stating that although in certain circumstances an air-
craft manual may constitute a "part" for purposes of the statute,
the court held that the plaintiff did not demonstrate that the
supplemental manual was a "part" of the particular aircraft at
issue and likewise failed to allege a specific causal connection
between the crash and the allegedly false or inadequate warn-
ings contained in the supplemental manual.13 8
In Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc. v. Heliqwest International, Ltd.,"'
the Tenth Circuit upheld the district court's dismissal of appel-
lant manufacturer's declaratory judgment action against appel-
lees: a helicopter's owner, a New Mexico corporation, and its
lessee, a Washington company that was using the helicopter at
the time of the crash in Utah. The district court granted the
owner's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and
declined to exercise jurisdiction over the manufacturer's declar-
atory judgment action, which concerned the applicability of
GARA to the accident.44 ° In upholding the lower court's rul-
ings, the Tenth Circuit noted that the requested declaratory
judgment would not settle the controversy arising from the
crash.44' The court also found that the manufacturer failed to
make a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction because the
owner did not have any direct contacts with Utah and the parties
executed the lease in Canada to a Washington company.4 4 2
IX. INSURANCE COVERAGE
A. ALBERTO-CULVER CO. v. AON CoRp.
On May 13, 2004, the First District of the Illinois Appellate
Court considered the application of "commercial aviation" ex-
clusion in an aviation liability insurance policy. 443 In Alberto-Cul-
ver Company v. Aon Corporation, the matter involved an aircraft
accident involving a Gulfstream G-1V aircraft (G-IV) privately
owned by Alberto-Culver Company and being utilized by various
Aon entities.444 Aon and Alberto each maintained a flight de-
437 Id. at *43.
438 Id. at *43-44.
439 385 F.3d 1291, 1294 (10th Cir. 2004).
440 Id. at 1294, 1298-99.
441 Id. at 1299.
442 Id. at 1298-99.
443 Alberto-Culver Co. v. Aon Corp., 812 N.E.2d 369 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004).
- Id. at 372.
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partment at Palwaukee, and each operated their own G-JV, a
twin-engine jet that requires a two-pilot crew.4 4 5 The instant
flight was conducted pursuant to an Interchange Agreement
which permitted Aon and Alberto to utilize each other's G-1V
when needed.446 Paragraph Six of the Interchange Agreement
provided that Aon Aviation and Alberto agreed to:
(1) 'hold harmless and indemnify the other from loss, expense,
damages, claims, or suits which they might suffer as a result of
any act or omission of the other party'; (2) maintain operational
control of their own G-IV during use by the other party; and (3)
'have, and keep in effect' an aircraft insurance policy with a mini-
mum $150 million value to provide coverage when piloting each
other's airplanes.447
The plane crashed on October 30, 1996, upon takeoff at
Palwaukee Municipal Airport, killing all four persons aboard.
448
The dispute implicated insurance coverage issued by Associ-
ated Aviation Underwriters (AAU), Alberto's insurers, and
United States Aviation Underwriters ("USAU"), the insurers of
Aon. 449 AAU sought, inter alia, a judicial declaration that Aon
was not insured under the aircraft insurance policy AAU issued
to Alberto.4 5° USAU intervened and successfully moved for
cross-summary judgment against AAU and Alberto.4 1' The cir-
cuit court found that Aon was entitled to coverage under Al-
berto's policy with AAU, and that AAU had a duty to defend and
indemnify Aon because the court deemed AAU's policy primary
coverage, and it found USAU's coverage excess to the AAU pol-
icy.4 52 Alberto appealed. 453
Importantly, neither the USAU policy nor the AAU policy
made reference to the Interchange Agreement between Alberto
and Aon, nor was any evidence produced by Alberto or Aon re-
questing that their respective insurance companies make the In-
terchange Agreement a part of their respective policies of
insurance by rider, endorsement or otherwise.454 Under the In-
445 Id.
446 Id.
447 Id. (quoting paragraph six of the Interchange Agreement).
448 Id.
449 Id. at 373.
450 Id. at 374.
451 Id. at 374-75.
452 Id. at 375.
453 Id.
454 Id. at 373.
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terchange Agreement, both parties agreed to maintain "opera-
tional control" of their own aircraft during use by the other
party.455 The Interchange-Agreement does not define "opera-
tional control," but refers to the Federal Aviation Administra-
tion for an explanation of this term.4 5
6
Alberto was the named insured on the AAU policy.14 57. The
AAU policy defined an "Insured" as:
(a) any person while using the aircraft with the permission of the
Named Insured provided the actual use is within the scope of
such permission, and (b) any other person, or organization, but
only with respect to his or its liability because of acts or omissions
of the Named Insured or of an Insured under (a) above, pro-
vided, however, that the insurance afforded under subsections
2(a) and (b) above does not apply to: (i) any person or organiza-
tion or agent or employee thereof (other than employees of the
Named Insured) engaged in *** the operation of *** any flying
service, or aircraft or piloting service, with respect to any occur-
rence arising out of such activity (Exclusion (i)).458
The AAU policy did not define the phrase "flying service or
aircraft or piloting service. '' 45' The AAU policy also set forth, in
General Condition Four, a provision of "Other Insurance"
which avers,
[e]xcept with respect to insurance specifically purchased by [Al-
berto] to apply in excess of this policy, if there is other insurance
in [Alberto's] name or otherwise, against loss, liability or expense
covered by this policy, [AAU] shall not be liable *** for a greater
portion of such loss *** than the applicable limit of [AAU's] lia-
bility bears to the total applicable [1] imit of [1] iability of all valid
and collectible insurance against such loss, liability or
expense. 460  .
The AAU policy additionally provided Alberto with liability
coverage for its use of non-owned aircraft.46 ' That part of the
policy contained its own condition of "Other Insurance," under
which AAU's non-owned coverage was to be in excess of any




-8 Id. (quoting the AAU general policy definitions).
459 Id.




under a policy applicable to the non-owned aircraft or
otherwise. "462
Similarly, Aon held non-owned aircraft coverage by obtaining
an endorsement to its policy with USAU, which states: "[y]our
business needs may require you [to] rent, borrow, or use aircraft
you don't own." 3 For this reason, we've developed this endorse-
ment to expand your liability coverage and your medical cover-
age to apply while you're using aircraft you don't own." The
USAU policy's non-owned coverage endorsement also contains
an "other insurance" clause that asserts: "[t]his endorsement
provides you with excess insurance. This means that if you have
other insurance covering a loss that's also covered by this en-
dorsement, we'll pay claims only when all other valid and col-
lectible insurance covering the loss has been exhausted. Of
course, this restriction does not apply to any insurance you pur-
chased in excess of this endorsement. 4
64
After the crash, Aon Aviation notified AAU of the accident,
seeking coverage under the AAU policy issued to Alberto. 65 Al-
berto and its insurers (collectively AAU/Alberto) filed a com-
plaint for an insurance coverage declaration on January 17,
1997, seeking, inter alia, a judgment that Aon Aviation was not
an insured under the AAU policy issued to Alberto."" On May
2, 2001, USAU, moved to intervene in the action, which the cir-
cuit court allowed on July 5, 2001.467
On November 1, 2001, AAU/Alberto filed its fourth amended
complaint in which it sought (1) subrogation from Aon Aviation
for reimbursement of funds AAU paid to Alberto for the de-
struction of its aircraft; and a declaratoryjudgment that (2) Aon
Corporation was not a permissive user entitled to coverage, (3)
Aon Aviation was engaged in the operation of a flight service
thereby precluding coverage, and (4) Aon Aviation waived cov-
erage under the AAU policy pursuant to the Interchange
Agreement.4 6
On March 25, 2002, USAU moved for summary judgment on






467 Id. at 374.
468 Id. at 375.
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claim regarding the operation of flight service. 469 After a hear-
ing on August 2, 2002, the circuit court ruled that the question
of whether Aon Aviation was engaged in a flight service opera-
tion did not foreclose coverage under the AAU policy, ,and that
AAU had a duty to defend, and to indemnify Aon Aviation since
AAU's policy was the primary coverage and USAU's policy was in
excess.
4 70
In seeking to exclude Aon Aviation from coverage under the
AAU policy, AAU/Alberto primarily contended that Aon Avia-
tion waived its right to coverage by virtue of its assent to and
execution of the Interchange Agreement. 471 However, the court
found that the Interchange Agreement only had "tangential rel-
evance" to the appeal.472 Instead, the court held that the cover-
age dispute turned on the construction of the AAU policy
without regard to the Interchange Agreement. 473
The policy language at issue is located in Exclusion (i) of
AAU's policy, which denies coverage to "any person or organiza-
tion *** engaged in *** the operation of any *** flight service,
or aircraft or piloting service. '4 74 AAU/Alberto concedes that
Aon Aviation was using the aircraft with permission, but asserts,
"permissive user status is not equivalent to insured status. ' 475 It
maintains that at the time of the accident, Aon Aviation was op-
erating such a service, thus triggering the application of Exclu-
sion (i). 4 7 6
USAU/Aon Aviation counter that the court must construe
"service" to exclude only those entities engaged in "commercial"
aircraft operations, not in-house aircraft transportation. 477 It
claims this reading is buttressed by the juxtaposition of "flight
service" amidst "other, purely commercial activities," including
the "operation of any airport, hangar, [or] flying school," where
no disjunctive language sets apart the activities.4 78 It argues fur-
ther that the exclusion conflicts with the stated purpose of the
469 Id.
470 Id.






477 Id. at 378.
478 Id.
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AAU policy, which covers Alberto's aircraft for "[a] lI operations
of the Named Insured.
479
Affording the words their plain, ordinary, and popular mean-
ing, exclusion (i) is clear and unambiguous in the context of
USAU/Aon Aviation's specific challenge - which the activities
described must be "commercial" to trigger the exclusion. "Ser-
vice" need not connote monetary exchange, and is defined
more aptly as "a duty or labor to be rendered by one person to
another," or the "performance of labor for benefit of another,
or at another's command. '4 0 The circuit court's grant of sum-
mary judgment was unwarranted and, where no material issue of
fact remained, the appellate court reversed the circuit court's
ruling.48 ' The AAU policy excluded Aon Aviation from coverage
as a matter of law.4
82
The appellate court also determined the USAU non-owned
aircraft coverage was primary to the AAU policy based on the
policy endorsement for non-owned aircraft, which stated pri-
mary coverage is subject to "all other valid and collectible insur-
ance covering the loss [must be] exhausted. 483
B. POTTER V. U.S. SPECIALTY INSURANCE CO.:
MEANING OF "LOGGED" HouRs
Recently, the Arizona Court of Appeals considered the mean-
ing of "logged hours" in the context of an aviation insurance
policy. In Potter v. U.S. Specialty Ins. Co., USSIC denied coverage
for losses associated with the crash of an aircraft.48 4 Potter sued
USSIC seeking declaratory relief and damages.480 USSIC coun-
terclaimed for declaratory relief, alleging that there was no cov-
erage for the crash because the pilot had not "logged" the
minimum flight hours required for coverage under the pol-
icy.48 6 The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment,
and the trial court granted USSIC's motion.487  Potter
appealed.488
479 Id.
480 Id. at 379 (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1368 (6th ed. 1990)).
481 Id. at 380.
482 Id.
483 Id. at 381-82.
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The policy provided that the aircraft was insured against cer-
tain losses when either Melvin Potter piloted it or the aircraft
was piloted by a commercially certified pilot who had a mini-
mum of 3,000 "logged pilot hours," 1,500 of which had been
"logged in multi-engine aircraft," and one hundred of which
had been "logged in the same make and model" as the aircraft
covered.489 Mitchell Schier was piloting the aircraft 'when it
crashed.490 All died in the crash.491 Schier had been a licensed
pilot since May 1984 and acquired his commercial license with
single and multiengine ratings in 1986.492 Thereafter, he flew
charter flights in both single and multiengine aircraft.493 He re-
ceived a flight instructor's certificate in February 1986 and
worked as a flight instructor since August 2000.494 In response to
interrogatories, Potter stated that "[Schier] had told Mel Potter
that he had logged well over-one thousand five hundred hours
of multi-engine flight time ... [and] had certainly logged over
fifty hours in a [Cessna 414] and; indeed, much more than
that. '495 But the single logbook found in Schier's effects docu-
mented only 236 pilot hours, all of-which had been flown in
single engine aircraft within approximately a two-month period
in 2001.496
Although USSIC conceded at the trial court and on appeal
that Schier actually had flown more than was reflected in the
logbook, the trial court granted summary judgment based on its
conclusion that the term "logged" as used in the policy, which
did not define the term, meant "hours actually flown and relia-
bly recorded in a flight time log."4 97 Potter argued that the court
should interpret the term "logged" to mean hours flown but not
necessarily recorded and that the trial court erred in granting
USSIC's motion for summary judgment because there was a
question of fact as to how many hours Schier -had flown as a









497 Id. at 558-59.
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The court rejected plaintiffs proffered interpretation of
"logged hours" and found the term to be unambiguous. 4 9 It
also looked to other jurisdictions that considered this issue and
noted those decisions had uniformly determined that the word
"logged,' in a pilot warranty provision of an insurance contract
meant hours actually and reliably recorded in a log book.5 °°
The court also found that this definition was consistent with the
intent of the clause and industry common knowledge. 50  There-
fore, the court affirmed the grant of summary judgment.51 2
X. 9/11 LITIGATION
The following is a summary of the September 11th liability
litigation and property damage litigation highlights.
A. LIABILITY LITIGATION
The liability litigation arising out of the September 11 terror-
ist attacks has produced a number of decisions, the most signifi-
cant of which may be the denial of defendants' motion to
dismiss certain claims based on the lack of duty.50 3 In their mo-
tion, the airlines and security companies argued that they owed
no duty to the ground victims under the applicable New York
law because the events of September 11 were completely unex-
pected and to impose such a duty would be tantamount to a
duty running from these defendants to the public-at-large. 0 4
Additionally, the defendants argued that even if a duty of care
existed under New York law, the federal laws under which the
defendants operated prescribed the class of persons protected
under the anti-hijacking program-namely the passengers and
crew of the aircraft. 50 5
In rejecting these arguments, the court reasoned that the
plaintiffs and society in general reasonably expected that the ac-
tivities of these defendants to prevent hijackings were for the
protection of the passengers, crew, and individuals on the
ground. 51" Further, the court found that the cap on the liability,




502 Id. at 560.
503 In re Sept. 11 Litigation, 280 F. Supp. 2d 279 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
504 Id. at 288-89.
505 Id. at 289.
506 Id. at 292.
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unlimited or insurer-like liability impossible in this instance.5 °7
The court went on to adopt the primary argument of the plain-
tiffs: the defendants were in the best position to provide protec-
tion against hijackings and imposing on them a duty in this
regard best allocated the risks to victims in the aircraft and on
the ground.50 8 The court also rejected defendants' arguments
that federal law limited the scope of defendants' duty to passen-
gers and crew on the basis that the federal aviation regulations
did not specifically exclude ground victims. 5°9
The court then analyzed whether or not the use of the aircraft
by terrorists to cause the destruction that took place on 11 Sep-
tember 2001 was foreseeable. 510 The court noted that issues of
foreseeability are generally fact-based and not appropriately de-
cided by a motion to dismiss, unless the harm was so unforesee-
able that the aviation defendants would prevail even when
regarding the issue in the light most favorable to the plain-
tiffs. 511 Under this constraint, the court found that aircraft acci-
dents could be a foreseeable hazard of negligent screening and
boarding activities.512 The court went on to find that while an
organized terrorist hijacking with the purpose of maximum de-
struction and headlines had not occurred previously, the avia-
tion defendants could reasonably foresee that personal injury
and property damage could occur from hijackers taking control
of an aircraft.51 3
In reaching its conclusion on the existence of a duty, the
court was careful to qualify its decision as a preliminary one,
stating: "I hold at this stage of the litigation, on the pleadings
and before any discovery has taken place, that the injuries suf-
fered by the ground victims arose from risks that were within
the scope of the duty undertaken by the aviation defendants." '514
The court's latter opinion echoed the preliminary nature of
this ruling denying leave for interlocutory appeal of its decision
on the existence of a duty.515 While acknowledging the defend-
ants' argument that the case presented novel and difficult issues,
507 Id. at 293.
508 Id. at 296.
509 Id. at 298.
510 Id. at 295.
511 Id. at 295-96.
512 Id. at 296.
513 Id.
514 Id. at 296-97.
5 In reSept. 11 Litigation, No. CIV.A.21MC-917(AKH), 2003 WL 22251325, at
*1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 1, 2003).
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the court ruled that, the uncertainty surrounding the legal du-
ties owed by the defendants was a reason to deny an interlocu-
tory appeal. 5"'6 According to the court, the complex balancing
of interests better positioned it to establish and define the legal
duties when there is a fully developed factual record.51 7 In mak-
ing this point, the court noted that several of the cases cited by
the defendants were decided based on the evidence."' In other
words, the court held that while the existence of a duty is a ques-
tion of law, answering this question requires an analysis of the
individual facts of a case.5 1 9 Consequently, the court stated that
defendants would be able to re-present their arguments in later
proceedings, but indicated that they should wait until the close
of discovery when the factual record was complete. 2
B. FIRST PARTY PROPERTY INSURER COVERAGE LITIGATION
In World Trade Center Properties, L.L.C. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co.,
the Second Circuit affirmed a lower court's decision that the
New York terrorist attacks were one occurrence under certain
policies insuring the World Trade Center complex.521' The poli-
cies defined an "occurrence" to mean:
all losses or damages that are attributable directly or indirectly to
one cause or to one series of similar causes. All such losses will
be added together and the total amount of such losses will be
treated as one occurrence irrespective of the period of time or
area over which such losses occur.52 2
Construing this language, the court held that a reasonable fact
finder was bound to conclude that the two aircraft crashes in the
New York terrorist attacks were, at least, "a series of similar
causes."'
23
XI. WARSAW CONVENTION / MONTREAL AGREEMENT
In November 2003, the Montreal Agreement 1999 came into
effect as an international treaty. The United States signed the
516 Id. at *3.
517 Id.
,-I Id. at *4.
51b Id. at *5.
520 Id.
52, 345 F.3d 154, 159 (2d Cir. 2003).
522 Id. at 160.
523 Id. at 180.
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Montreal Agreement 1999524 which superceded and updated
the previous Warsaw Convention 25 (as amended by the Hague
Protocol of 1955) which itself had been subject to various
amendments.
The purpose of the Montreal Agreement 1999 was to provide
a single, uniform international convention to govern the liability
of air carriers with respect to passenger and cargo claims arising
out of the international carriage of passengers and goods by air.
The Montreal Agreement 1999 uses many of the same con-
cepts and phrases as the Warsaw Convention and, consequently,
much of the existing Warsaw Convention case law remains rele-
vant. There are important differences not least of which is that
the Montreal Agreement 1999 clarifies the position with regard
to the exclusivity of that Convention for passenger claims, as
well as spelling out, in express terms, the exclusion of punitive
and non-compensatory damages. The Montreal Agreement
1999 also incorporates an earlier protocol [Montreal Additional
Protocol No. 4] that provides an absolute limit of 17 Special
Drawing Rights per kilogram in respect of cargo claims.
However, the most significant development is the incorpora-
tion of the so-called "Fifth Jurisdiction," which extends the four
jurisdictions set out in Article 28 of the Warsaw Convention to
include as the "Fifth Jurisdiction," the domicile of the passen-
ger. While the wording of the new Article 33 of the Montreal
Agreement 1999 is only intended to provide jurisdiction to pas-
sengers in their country of domicile when the carrier operates
services either directly or indirectly to the country of the passen-
ger's domicile, it is likely that there will be disputes on the inter-
pretation of this clause.
A. APPLICABILITY OF CONVENTIONS
In order to assess whether or not a claim falls within the ambit
of either the Warsaw Convention or the Montreal Agreement
1999, it is important to look at the contract of carriage. For ex-
ample, a flight between New York and London, returning to
New York, is clearly international carriage, although it is impor-
524 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Carriage by Air, signed at Montreal, May 28,1999, at http://www.lawbiz.ch/
spahni/airlaw/warsaw/montreal.html [hereinafter Montreal Agreement 1999].
525 Warsaw Convention, as amended at the Hauge 1955 and by Protocol No. 4





tant to remember that the destination is New York, as opposed
to London. The importance of the contract of carriage remains,
as a significant number of countries have not ratified the Mon-
treal Agreement 1999. It is always important to check that the
contract of carriage is between states which have ratified the
Montreal Agreement 1999 before concluding whether or not
the Montreal Agreement 1999 applies, or alternatively the War-
saw Convention, or indeed some alternative treaty or legislation.
B. CASE SUMMARIES
As there have not been any decided cases in the U.S. directly
on a point of difference between the Warsaw Convention and
the Montreal Agreement 1999, I set out below case law on the
Warsaw Convention.
1. When an Omission May Constitute an "Accident" Under
Article 17
As noted, above, the Supreme Court decision of Olympic Air-
ways v. Husain considered the issue of whether the flight crew's
failure to reseat an asthmatic passenger (who had asked on a
number of occasions to be reseated) away from a smoking area
on board an Olympic Airways flight constituted an "accident"
pursuant to Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention.526
The Supreme Court held that Olympic Airways failed to fully
develop their argument that the failure to move in the circum-
stances of the case were neither "unusual or unexpected," and
consequently concluded that the circumstances did constitute
something "unusual or unexpected," one of the key factors in
determining whether or not there was an accident.527
Similarly, in Blansett v. Continental Airlines, Inc., the airline's
failure to warn a passenger about the risks of developing DVT
within an aircraft cabin did not constitute an unusual or unex-
pected event.528 The court was able to distinguish Olympic Air-
ways on the basis that the flight crew had not taken any positive
steps. 5 2 The Court of Appeals explained that the situation in
Olympic Airways was "markedly" different to that in Blansett v.
Continental, as Olympic Airways involved an unreasonable denial
of a request to be moved to an empty seat by a passenger exper-
526 See supra notes 45-50 and accompanying text.
527 See supra notes 59-64 and accompanying text.
52 See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
529 See supra notes 69-74.
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iencing an allergic reaction. 530 The court went on to rule specif-
ically that failure to warn of DVT risk, even in contravention of
industry standards, is not an accident under the Warsaw Con-
vention.53 ' This decision was, therefore, a rejection of the lower
district court's analysis, which had held that an accident oc-
curred if there had been unreasonable departure from industry
standards. The court did, however, comment that certain de-
partures from industry standards could constitute an accident,
but that there was no blanket rule that this would always be the
case.
532
The approach that DVT does not constitute an accident pur-
suant to the Warsaw Convention was adopted in Rodriguez v. An-
sett Australia Ltd.,533 which effectively adopted the reasoning of
an earlier case, Louie v. British Airways Ltd.5 34 Courts have cited
to Louie as authority for the proposition that it is possible for a
court to find the carrier liable for a failure to respond to an in-
flight medical emergency, but that failure to warn passengers of
the risks of developing DVT (not arising out of a medical emer-
gency) does not constitute an accident. 535
2. Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder and Other Psychological Injury
Claims
In Eastern Airlines v. Floyd, the Supreme Court held that "an air
carrier cannot be held liable under Article 17 when an accident
has not caused a passenger to suffer death, physical injury, or
physical manifestation of injury. '5 3 6 This left open the impor-
tant issue of whether psychological injuries constitute bodily in-
jury and therefore whether they are a recoverable head of
damages or alternatively whether the Warsaw Convention ex-
cludes this head of damage. The courts have consistently up-
held the proposition that psychological injuries are recoverable
only to the extent that they result from a bodily injury. There
has to be a causative link between the psychological injury and
the physical injury which "caused it."
In Ehrlich v. American Airlines, Inc., the Ehrlichs were in an air-
craft accident in which their aircraft overshot the runway and
530 Id.
531 Blansett, 379 F.3d at 182.
532 Id.
533 383 F.3d 914, 919 (9th Cir. 2004).
534 No. CIV.A-AO1-0329, 2003 WL 22769110 (D. Ala. Nov. 13, 2003).
535 Id. at *5.
536 499 U.S. .530, 552 (1991).
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crashed into a retaining wall, preventing the aircraft from
plunging into a river below.5"7 Ms. Ehrlich suffered physical in-
juries, including injury to her neck, back, shoulder, hips and
knees.538 Mr. Ehrlich suffered knee injuries.539
The Ehrlichs further claimed that they sustained mental in-
jury.4 °1 Unusually, the Ehrlichs did not offer any evidence to
demonstrate a causal connection between their mental and
physical injuries. 54 ' As a result, the court dismissed their claim
for psychological injuries, leaving the physical injury claims.542
On appeal, the Second Circuit upheld the grant of partial sum-
mary judgment.543
In Marks v. Virgin Atlantic Ainays, Mrs. Marks, who was preg-
nant at the time, tripped and fell in the aisle of a Virgin Atlantic
Airways aircraft.544 Mrs. Marks claimed that there was a bag pro-
truding into the aisle and that because of the fall, she injured
her leg, arm, hip, back and "tummy. '545 Doctors in the U.S. and
U.K. subsequently examined Mrs. Marks and her unborn
child. 546 These doctors advised Mrs. Marks that the child was
healthy and uninjured.547
Mrs. Marks sought damages, inter alia, for mental injuries
based on fear of injury to her unborn child.54' There is some
discussion in the case concerning the extent of the injuries
which Mrs. Marks suffered, however, she only offered evidence
that she hurt her "tummy" to support her psychological harm
claim. 549 Again, it appears that the passenger failed to provide
any evidence to substantiate her allegation that she suffered a
stomach injury and that such injury caused the psychological in-
jury for which she was claiming damages.
In Bobian v. Czech Airlines,55' a number of passengers brought
a claim against Czech Airlines after a turbulence incident. The
537 360 F.3d 366, 367 (2d Cir. 2004).
538 Id. at 368.
539 Id.
540 Id.
541 Id. at 369.
542 Id.
543 Id. at 401.





549 Id. at *2.
55o No. CV.A.03-1262, 2004 WL 628864, at *1 (3d Cir. Mar. 26, 2004).
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plaintiffs claimed their injuries were physically based "in the
neurochemical and neuropsychological reactions in critical
brain areas dedicated to emotional control and regulation. 551
The court rejected the claims and took the view that the plain-
tiffs' position would effectively abolish the Warsaw Convention
requirement that there has to be a "palpable and conspicuous
physical injury. '5 52 None of the plaintiffs brought forward any
persuasive evidence that their alleged injuries caused any physi-
cal change to their brains.
3. Injury Arising Out of Disinfectant
The In re UAL Corp.553 matter came before the U.S. Bankruptcy
Court in relation to a class action for $6 billion brought by Rich-
ard Derrazio and Sharon Derrazio, and others against United
Airlines. The class action sought damages for personal injuries
suffered due to the disinfection of United Airlines aircraft that
flew into Australia and New Zealand. 554 The bankruptcy court
rejected the passengers' assertions that their claim arose from
an "accident" under the Warsaw Convention.5 55 In an attempt
to circumvent the problems of demonstrating that the spraying
was unusual or unexpected (United routinely sprays all flights
into these countries), the passengers argued that the unusual
event was UAL's failure to warn.556 The court rejected this argu-
ment, and because the Convention was the passengers' exclusive
remedy, the court disallowed their claim.557
4. Seizure of a Bag Can Constitute an Accident
The case of Prescod v. American Airlines558 relates to the circum-
stances that arose prior to the passenger's flight. The passen-
ger's daughter advised a departure agent that the plaintiff's
carry-on bag contained a breathing apparatus and related medi-
cation. 559 American Airlines checked the bag and subsequently
lost it for 2 days before arriving at the passenger's destination.56 °
The airline's representatives had previously advised that they
551 Id.
552 Id.
553 310 B.R. 373, 375 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2004).
554 Id.
555 Id.
556 Id. at 385.
557 Id. at 387.
558 381 F.3d 861, 863 (9th Cir. 2004).
559 Id. at 863-64.
560 Id. at 864.
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would not take the equipment.56 I The passenger was subse-
quently hospitalized and died. -" 2
The court held that the carrier's failure to comply with a
health-based request to ensure that the bag traveled with the
passenger constituted an unusual or unexpected event.563 Using
the same reasoning as in Olympic Airways, the court found that
the removal of the bag, in light of the carrier's knowledge of the
passenger's need for it, as well as the various promises made by
the carrier that it would not take the bag, constituted something
which was "unusual or unexpected. 564
5. Punitive Damages Under the Warsaw System
In Razi v. China Airlines, the court held that the Convention
provided an exclusive remedy for passengers and that punitive
damages are not available in cases of death or personal injury
under the Warsaw Convention, thereby following El Al Israel Air-
lines v. Tseng. This claim arose out of "excessively dangerous hot
tea.,,1566
6. Loss of Enjoyment of Vacation
In Lee v. American Airlines,56 7 Mr. Lee sought compensation for
damages arising out of a flight delay, and in particular for incon-
venience and loss of a "refreshing, memorable vacation." The
court granted American Airlines partial judgment on the basis
that the damages sought constituted an attempt to recover for
psychological injury as no economic loss had occurred.5" 8 On
appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the grant of summary judg-
ment in favor of the carrier.
561 Id.
562 Id. at 865.
563 Id. at 868.
564 Id.
565 No. CIV.A.03008169DDPMCX, 2004 NAIL 1001083, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 15,
2004).
5166 Id. at *3.
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7. Adverse Reaction to Proper Medical Treatment Is Not an
Accident
In the case of Horvath v. Deutsche Lufthansa AG,57 ° the passen-
ger suffered an allergic reaction to a meal served on board. A
fellow passenger who was also on board, and who was a qualified
physician, provided assistance and administered medication to
the passenger.571 Unfortunately, the medication aggravated the
passenger's condition. 572 The plaintiff conceded that the treat-
ment and medication provided was proper by medical
standards.573
The subsequent claim and court proceedings were therefore
rejected on the basis that such proper medical intervention did
not constitute an accident, notwithstanding that the medication
aggravated the passenger's condition.574 The parties contested
at trial the facts surrounding the service of the meal.575
8. Embarkation/Disembarkation
The Warsaw Convention only applies to accidents to passen-
gers which occur during the course of embarkation or disembar-
kation or, alternatively, during the course of carriage by air. As
a result, any accident or injury which occurs before or after a
passenger embarks or disembarks an aircraft is subject to an al-
ternative legal regime. This can be significant particularly when
the alternative legal regime provides for a longer limitations pe-
riod and/or the prospects of recovering damages without the
restrictions traditionally associated with the Warsaw Convention.
In the case of Fazio v. Northwest Airlines,576 two disabled passen-
gers sustained injuries on an airport terminal escalator. In this
case, the plaintiffs were seeking to establish that the accident did
not occur during the course of disembarkation because they
had failed to issue proceedings within the two-year limitation pe-
riod provided for in Article 29 of the Warsaw Convention.577
The court held that the premise of this claim related to disem-
570 No. CIV.A.02-3269(PKC), 2004 WL 486976 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 12, 2004).
571 Id.
572 Id.
573 Id. at *2.
574 Id. at *3.
575 Id. at *1.
576 No. CIV.A.1:03-CV-808, 2004 WL 1001234, at *1 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 15,
2004).
577 Id. at *2.
234
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
barkation and that, consequently, the claim was time-barred
pursuant to Article 29 of the Warsaw Convention.78
9. Jurisdiction
Article 28 provides four jurisdictions in which a plaintiff can
sue based on an accident governed by the Warsaw Conven-
tion.57 ' These are: the carrier's domicile, its principal place of
business, the place through which the passenger purchased her
tickets, and the destination of the flight. Furthermore, it is im-
portant to bear in mind that the destination is the ultimate des-
tination as defined by the contract of carriage.
In In re Air Crash Near Nantucket Island, Mass.,58° the court held
that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the actions
brought against an Egyptian air carrier on behalf of Egyptian
passengers who were killed on an international flight because
the U.S. did not meet the four Warsaw Convention jurisdictional
requirements.
The amendments to Article 28 in the Montreal Agreement
1999 provide jurisdiction within the U.S. for U.S. domiciled pas-
sengers if the carrier operates to or from the U.S. directly or
through a commercial agreementith another carrier. 511 It is
typical that a passenger's domicile is also the passenger's desti-
nation. Consequently, although an important extension, the so-
called "fifth jurisdiction" contained within the Montreal Agree-
ment 1999 may not be as significant as first thought, however,
much will depend upon the way in which the courts interpret
the domicile requirements set out in the Montreal Agreement
1999 and the nature of the airline's operation and commercial
relationships.
578 There is a long line of cases going back to Day v. Trans World Airlines, 528
F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1975), which provide that there is no absolute test in respect of
what constitutes embarkation or disembarkation. Rather, the courts should ap-
ply a tripartite test and consider factors such as the activity of the passenger at the
time of the accident; the extent to which the airline was exercising control over
the passenger at the time of the injury; and the physical location of the accident.
579 Warsaw Convention, supra note 525.
580 See In re Air Crash Near Nantucket Island, Mass., 307 F. Supp. 2d 465
(E.D.N.Y 2004).
-51 Montreal Agreement 1999, supra note 524.
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10. Parties to the Warsaw Convention
In Central Ins. Co., Ltd. v. China Airlines Ltd.,582 the court con-
sidered whether the Warsaw Convention applied to carriage be-
tween the U.S. and Taiwan. The status of Taiwan as a High
Contracting Party to the Warsaw Convention has been the sub-
ject of previous lawsuits. However, the court followed the major-
ity view that Taiwan is not a party to the Warsaw Convention,
and consequently, the Warsaw Convention did not apply to this
claim.583
11. Travel Agent Is Not a Carrier
Vaughn v. American Automobile Association, Inc.5 84 involved the
novel issue of whether a travel agent is a "carrier" under the
Convention. The court held that the travel agency that issued
the passengers tickets in this case was not a carrier and, conse-
quently, was unable to take advantage of the two-year limitation
period under Article 29.585
12. Notification of Claim: Cargo Cases
Watkins Syndicate v. Tampa Airlines586 involved a claim arising
out of damage to an international shipment of garment fabric.
A dispute arose about whether written notice of claim had been
given within the fourteen-day notice period provided for under
the Warsaw Convention.
The carrier claimed that they did not receive formal, written
notification of the claim and that the notice of damage marked
on a copy of the pick-up form was insufficient written notice for
the purpose of the Warsaw Convention.5 8 ' However, the court
denied the carrier's motion for summary judgment as there
were issues of fact remaining in respect of the adequacy of the
notice and the existence of fraud, which was also alleged.88
582 No. CIV.A.-02-5075-MJJ, 2004 WL 742916, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 24, 2004).
583 Id.
584 326 F. Supp. 2d 195, 197 (D. Mass. 2004).
585 Id. at 198.
586 No. CIV.A.03-5937 (MBM), 2004 WL 2290501 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 8, 2004).
587 Id. at 3.
588 Id. at 5.
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13. Only the Air Carrier Can "Take Advantage" of the Provisions
of the Warsaw Convention-Cargo
In In re Certain Interested Underwriters at Lloyd's v. Barridoff Gal-
leries,8 9 the consignee's insurers brought an action against the
shippers of a painting. However, the district court held that
none of the defendants qualified for treatment as air carriers
within the meaning of the Warsaw Convention..5 11' The ship-
ment's only contracted air carriage identified the carrier on the
air way bill. 59 As the air carrier identified on the air way bill was
not a party to the action, the defendants did not have the ability
to pursue an action under the Warsaw Convention. -2
14. Preemption of State Law Claims
In Hanson v. Delta Airlines,593 the plaintiff sued Delta under
Illinois state law for wrongful imprisonment, malicious prosecu-
tion, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Plaintiff's
action arose out of her arrest after personnel at the interna-
tional flight ticket counter reported to the police that they over-
heard plaintiff utter the word "bomb. '594 Defendant adduced
no evidence to show plaintiff made this utterance. Delta
moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b) (6), asserting, inter alia, that
plaintiffs state law claims were preempted by the Warsaw Con-
vention. 596 The District Court for the Northern District of Illi-
nois found there was no evidence to support the application of
Warsaw, as Delta had not proven that plaintiff was in the course
of boarding when she was arrested.' : Consequently, the court
held that the Warsaw Convention did not preclude her
claims. 598
-589 No. CIV.A.03-191-P-S, 2004 NL 1877806, at *1 (D. Me. Aug. 20, 2004).
79o Id. at *6.
591 Id.
592 Id.
593 No. CIV.A.02-C7651, 2004 '"T 524686, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 17, 2004).
594 Id.
595 Id.
596 Id. at *2.
597 Id. at *7.
598 Id.
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